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TOO MUCH OF A GOOD THING: WHEN CHARITABLE
GIFTS AUGMENT VICTIM COMPENSATION
Robert A. Katz *
INTRODUCTION
The horrific events of September 11, 2001 encouraged the creation
of two vast funds to make payments to persons who were physically
injured in the attacks and to surv ivors of those who were killed (vic-
tims).' The first fund consists of voluntary contributions to charities
engaged in September 11th relief. These entities distributed more than
$800 million to victims. 2 The second is the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund of 2001 (the Fund), which Congress created to
provide compensation to the physically injured and bereaved, and
which may distribute as much as $3 billion to these persons.3 The si-
multaneous operation of these two funds raised fundamental ques-
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1. There were of course many persons adversely affected by September lth, such as those
who were physically or economically displaced. For convenience, however, I will use the term
"victims" to refer solely to the seriously injured and bereaved, unless indicated otherwise.
2. TOM SEESSEL, RESPONDING TO THE 9/11 TERRORIST ATTACKS: LESSONS FROM RELIEF AND
RECOVERY IN NEW YORK CITY 15 (2003), available at http://www.fordfound.org/publications/
recent-articles/docs/philanthropic-response ii.doc (last visited Oct. 23, 2003). These charities
raised over $2.6 billion as of October 31, 2002. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SEPTEMBER 11:
MORE EFFECTIVE COLLABORATION COULD ENHANCE CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS' CONTRI-
BUTIONS IN DISASTERS 31 (Report No. GAO-03-259), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d03259.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2003).
3. See generally Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, tit. IV, Pub. L. No.
107-42 § 403, 115 Stat. 230. The Act was subsequently amended by Pub. L. No. 107-71 § 124, 115
Stat. 631 (2001) and Pub. L. No. 107-134, § 114,115 Stat. 2435 (2002) [hereinafter Act]; Diana B.
Henriques, Concern Growing As Families Bypass 9/11 Victims' Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2003,
at Al. (citing Kenneth Feinberg, Special Master of the Fund) (The Fund may distribute as much
as $3 billion.).
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tions about the interaction between charitable giving and formal
mechanisms for compensating injury victims.
In a critical provision, the statute that created the Fund, the Air
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act (the Act), re-
quired governmental awards to be reduced "by the amount of the col-
lateral source compensation the claimant has received or is entitled to
receive as a result of the [attacks]."' 4 This provision was apparently
meant to prevent Fund awards from compensating losses that had
been, would be, or could be covered by other sources. This offset re-
quirement sparked one of the most controversial debates concerning
the Fund:5 Should charitable organizations be treated like other "col-
lateral sources"? Should Fund awards also be reduced by payments
received from charitable organizations (charitable gifts)? 6
On one level, this debate was about interpreting a statute-whether
the Act's plain meaning, its legislative history, canons of construction,
and so on, require charitable gifts to be offset against Fund awards
(charitable offset).7 On another level, the debate concerned the
proper use of charitable assets in general, and contributions to Sep-
tember 11th charities in particular. Was it appropriate to effectively
augment Fund awards with charitable gifts, even when these gifts were
not needed to alleviate financial distress? Did September 11th donors
want victims to collect both Fund awards and charitable gifts? (Alter-
natively, would these donors have wanted this result had they consid-
ered the matter when they contributed?) To what extent were the
donors' intentions even relevant?
In the end, the Fund program's administrators elected to ignore
charitable gifts when setting awards.8 This approach is consistent with
tort law's collateral source rule. Under this rule, a prevailing plaintiff's
compensation is not reduced by payments and benefits that the plain-
tiff (P) receives from sources independent of (or collateral to) the de-
4. Act, supra note 3, § 405(b)(6).
5. See, e.g., September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,274, 66,291
(Dec. 21, 2001) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 104 (2003)) [hereinafter September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund] ("[W]hether to reduce Fund awards by the amount of such contributions
was one of the issues given the most attention in the comments" on drafting regulations to im-
plement the Act.); David Barstow & Diana B. Henriques, A Nation Challenged: The Charities;
Debate over Rules for Victims Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2001, at Al (Whether to offset awards
by charity received was an "emotionally charged question.").
6. Charitable organizations provided September 11th victims with both financial and in-kind
assistance. This Article focuses exclusively on the financial assistance that charities provided for
victims' long-term relief. For convenience, I will use the term "charitable gifts" to refer exclu-
sively to this financial assistance.
7. See infra notes 156-160, 165-166 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 165-168 and accompanying text.
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fendant (D). 9 This is true even if these collateral-source benefits
cover all or part of the harm for which D is liable, 10 such that P's
receipt of both collateral-source benefits and full compensation from
D places P in a better economic position than before the tort. Tort
law applies the collateral source rule to a variety of benefits, including
(in most jurisdictions) charitable gifts."
The Fund controversy called attention to a long-standing, but rela-
tively unnoticed, tension in the interaction between charitable relief
and the tort system, our society's original mechanism for compensat-
ing injury victims. 12 More specifically, it reflects a tension between:
(a) restrictions that charity law imposes on the use of charitable assets
to assist injury victims; and (b) tort law's approach to compensating
injury victims who have received charitable gifts. This Article ex-
plores this tension and its implications for victim compensation
schemes.13 Its main claim is that tort law (and by implication the
Fund) facilitates the use of charitable assets in ways that violate key
charity law principles.
Charitable relief and tort compensation both alleviate injury-related
losses. The tension between these systems ultimately arises from the
fact that each uses a different baseline or yardstick for determining
how much loss-alleviation is appropriate. Similarly, each system uses
a different measure for determining how much loss-alleviation is ex-
cessive. When the tort system calculates an injury victim's compensa-
tion, it asks: "What would it take to restore P to the position she
occupied in the pre-injury world?" When a charity assesses how much
relief to provide, it asks: "What will it take to relieve this person's
immediate distress in the face of this injury?" From a charity law per-
spective, there is nothing intrinsically charitable about making cash
payments to restore an injury victim to the status quo ante. Loss alle-
viation ceases to be charitable, moreover, if it disburses more cash
than necessary to relieve the victim's financial distress. Lastly, a char-
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A(2) (1965).
10. Id.
11. This is the majority common law rule. In a few jurisdictions, common law courts do not
permit P to recover the value of gratuitous services. See infra notes 100-106 and accompanying
text.
12. The Fund program was created to provide September 11th victims with an alternative to
tort litigation. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, supra note 5 at 66,274 (Dec.21,
2001).
13. One can also explore this tension's implications for charity law and charitable activities.
See, e.g., infra notes 85-89, 149 and accompanying text. This Article's focus is more fitting for a
symposium on "The September 11th Compensation Fund and the Future of Civil Justice."
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ity can excessively benefit a victim from a charity law perspective
while undercompensating the victim from a tort law perspective.' 4
While a charity is making payments to relieve financial distress, it is
exceedingly difficult to say if and when that charity's aid has become
excessive. Each charity's managers set the sums in the first instance,
in a highly decentralized manner, according to criteria that reflect a
distinct set of values, the exigencies of the situation, and so forth. 15
This Article does not consider whether charitable gifts are excessive
when they are being disbursed directly to victims in the immediate
aftermath of their injuries.16 Rather, it focuses on the interaction be-
tween these charitable gifts and awards that victims subsequently ob-
tain from a formal compensation scheme. It pays special attention to
the collateral source rule, which expressly permits charitable gifts to
supplement even make-whole compensation awards.1 7 This rule rep-
resents the sharpest conflict between charity law and tort law. When
charitable assets serve to overcompensate injury victims from a tort
law perspective, they are also likely to confer excessive private benefit
from a charity law perspective.18
In addition to criticizing tort law's approach to charitable gifts, this
Article also criticizes certain assertions advanced to justify this ap-
proach. Tort law permits gifts from third-party benefactors to
overcompensate P for a variety of reasons, including deterrence. 19
Most relevantly, however, this result has been justified on grounds
that it effectuates the third-party benefactors' intent and because P
deserves the windfall more than D.20 Tort law's account of donor in-
tent conflicts with charity law's account, which is more nuanced and
satisfactory. Charity law presumes that charitable donors intended to
help P insofar as P has the relevant charitable characteristics, for ex-
ample, financial distress. Once P's distress is relieved, the donors pre-
14. For example, P may incur $10,000 in economic losses in a fire, but require only $1.000 to
meet immediate needs-say until P's insurer begins making payments under the policy. If the
Red Cross gives P $5,000 instead of $1,000, it confers $4,000 in private benefit. This still leaves P
undercompensated by $5,000.
15. See Robert A. Katz, A Pig in a Python: How the Charitable Response to September 11
Overwhelmed the Law of Disaster Relief 36 IND. L. REV. 251, 279-81 (2003).
16. I have considered the matter elsewhere. See generally id.
17. A damage award can simultaneously undercompensate and confer excessive private bene-
fit. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. To sharpen the analysis, however, I focus on cases
where the damages are presumed to compensate the victim for economic losses, unless otherwise
indicated.
18. This would not be the case, however, if P was in financial distress before the injury, and a
make-whole damage award would simply return her to that condition.
19. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
20. The underlying assumption is that public policy favors giving effect to donor intent and
that courts can and should advance this policy goal even when awarding tort damages.
[Vol. 53:547
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sumably intended their gifts' unused balance (the "charitable surplus"
or simply "surplus") to finance more charitable activity along the
same lines (cy pres).21 Here, such activity might be aiding other injury
victims who, unlike P, are presently distressed and uncompensated.
Such persons deserve the "windfall" more than either P or D.
Charity law, as should now be clear, has definite normative implica-
tions for how the tort system ought to award damages to injury victims
who have received charitable gifts for some of the same losses. When
setting compensation, tort law should neither ignore prior charitable
gifts to P, nor use them to reduce D's liability. Instead, it should at-
tempt to direct the surplus they represent to the same or similar chari-
table purposes as the original gifts'. In this way, the tort system can
simultaneously reduce the use of charitable assets for private enrich-
ment and increase the resources available for charitable activity.
Like tort law, the Fund program applies the collateral source rule to
charitable gifts, which is to say, it does not reduce a claimant's entitle-
ment under the Fund by the amount of charity gifts he or she has
received. This compensation scheme thus raises the same concern as
the tort system: Does it facilitate the use of charitable assets to confer
excessive private benefits? Yet, special circumstances affect charity
law's analysis of the Fund's approach to charitable gifts. These in-
clude the facts that the government, not the tortfeasor, pays Fund
awards,22 and that Congress enacted special legislation to speed up
and liberalize the disbursement of charitable gifts to September l1th
victims. 23
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses those elements of
charity law most relevant to the Article's analysis and argument. Part
III examines tort law's approach to charitable gifts and identifies the
difficulties it presents from a charity law perspective, often to society's
detriment. It also critiques the theory of donor intent and desert that
informs tort law's approach to charitable gifts. It addresses how the
tort system might be changed to address these concerns. Part IV re-
counts the controversy over whether the Fund program would reduce
a successful claimant's award by the amount of charitable gifts re-
ceived. It then applies Part III's framework to the Fund and considers
how the special circumstances affect its analysis and prescriptions.
21. See infra notes 66-78 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 188-193 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 173-176 and accompanying text.
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II. THE LAW OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS, CHARITABLE
GIVING, AND THE USE AND ABUSE
OF CHARITABLE ASSETS
This section reviews some general principles of charity law and spe-
cial rules for alleviating injury victims' losses. These are: (a) the prin-
ciple that charities must serve a public interest; (b) the prohibition
against using charitable assets to confer excessive private benefit; and
(c) the idea that once a gift's specific charitable purpose has been fully
accomplished, a gift's unused balance can-and generally must-be
reapplied to a related charitable purpose. This section also considers
how these principles apply to charities formed to provide monetary
aid to persons in financial distress due to disaster, crime, accident, or
other injury.
A. Charities Must Serve a Public Interest
In order to qualify as "charitable" under state and federal law, and
thereby obtain the numerous advantages that accompany such status,
an entity must be organized and operated to benefit the public.24
More specifically, it must be organized on a nonprofit basis25 and be
formed exclusively for one or more legally charitable purposes.26
These purposes include the relief of poverty and distress, the advance-
ment of education and religion, and lessening the burdens of
government.27
24. See e.g., section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) (as amended in 1990).
25. A nonprofit is not, as its name suggests, barred from generating profits, defined as the
"net earnings that remain with the [entity] after it has made all payments to which it is contractu-
ally committed, such as wages, interest payments, and prices for supplies." HENRY HANSMANN,
THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 11 (1996). Rather, a nonprofit's defining characteristic "is that
the persons who control the organization-including its members, directors, and officers-are
forbidden from receiving the organization's net earnings." Id. at 17. A nonprofit must devote its
net earnings, if any, "to financing [further production] of the services that the organization was
formed to provide." Id. at 228. This is sometimes referred to as the "nondistribution constraint."
Id. Although all charities are organized on a nonprofit basis, some nonprofit organizations are
not legally charitable, such as trade associations, homeowners associations, social clubs, and
other mutual benefit membership organizations. These entities exist primarily to serve the inter-
ests of their members.
26. A purpose may qualify as "charitable" under either the state law of charitable trusts and
public benefit nonprofit corporations, or federal tax law, or both. An entity is charitable under
federal tax law if it is tax-exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) and is eligible to receive tax-deducti-
ble contributions under I.R.C. § 170(c)(2). For convenience, I will use the concepts of "charita-
ble" under state and federal law interchangeably, even though they are not identical, unless
indicated otherwise.
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368 (1957); I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 170(c)(2) (2000);
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (as amended in 1990) ("The term 'charitable' is used in section
501(c)(3) in its generally accepted legal sense.").
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In operation, a charitable entity must engage primarily in activities
that accomplish its charitable purposes.2 8 The recipients of its cash,
goods, or services (a.k.a., "outputs") must constitute a "charitable
class."' 29 A charitable class might consist, for example, of poor, sick,
or elderly persons,30 or of disadvantaged artisans in developing socie-
ties of the world. 3' The Republican Party and its entities and candi-
dates, by contrast, are not a charitable class.32 One cannot use a
charity to earmark gifts for a particular person, and a closed class of
pre-selected individuals does not constitute a charitable class.33
Although a charity may transfer outputs directly to members of a
charitable class, the ultimate beneficiary of its activities is, in theory,
the broader public. 34 "[I]f a trust is set up to aid the poor of the city of
Yorkville," states the Bogerts' treatise on trusts:
[T]he community is the beneficiary in that there is a public interest
in relieving poverty and distress, and the residents of that city who
are from time to time selected to receive food, clothing and the like
are not beneficiaries of the charitable trust but are merely the
means through which the community receives benefits. 35
These public benefits have traditionally justified tax exemption for
charitable organizations, tax deductions for charitable donors, and
other legal advantages extended to charitable activities. 36 This is es-
pecially true for poverty and disaster relief organizations, which pro-
28. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (as amended in 1990) ("An organization will be regarded
as operated exclusively for one or more exempt purposes only if it engages primarily in activities
which accomplish one or more of such exempt purposes specified in section 501(c)(3).") (empha-
sis added).
29. See generally Aid to Artisans, Inc. v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. 202 (1978). These beneficiaries
must be "a sufficiently large or indefinite class so that the community is interested in the en-
forcement of the [charitable] trust." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 375. Key principles
and rules applicable to charitable trusts are generally applicable to charitable corporations. Id.
§ 348 cmt. f.
30. Ruth Rivera Huetter & Marvin Freidlander, Disaster Relief and Emergency Hardship Pro-
grams, in EXEMPT ORGANIZATION CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL IN-
STRUCTON PROGRAM FOR FY 1999 219-20 (1999).
31. Aid to Artisans, Inc., 71 T.C. at 213.
32. Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1076-78 (1989).
33. GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 363
(rev. 2d ed. 1977).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Most famously, federal law exempts charities from paying income taxes on their net earn-
ings, I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), and permits their donors to deduct contributions from their income
taxes. I.R.C. § 170(c) (2000). JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZA-
TIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 330 (2d ed. 2000) (Courts and commentators have traditionally
justified this "on the basis of the public benefits conferred by the organizations-benefits which
relieve the burdens of government by providing goods or services that society or government is
unable or unwilling to provide.").
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duce what economists call "mixed goods" or "impure public goods. 37
Food and clothing are private goods in that one recipient's consump-
tion of a meal or a sweater precludes others from consuming the same
item.38 Such goods are also public, however, because their consump-
tion by distressed persons generates significant benefits for the larger
community. These positive externalities can include less crime and
social disorder and a more productive workforce. 39
B. Charities Cannot Bestow Excessive Private Benefits
An entity is not organized or operated exclusively for a charitable
purpose "unless it serves a public rather than a private interest. '40 An
entity serves private interests, most notoriously, when its assets are
diverted to directors, officers, or other insiders for their personal
profit, unrelated to the advancement of any charitable purpose. This is
known as "private inurement. ' 41 More relevantly, an entity can serve
private interests by conferring excessive private benefits on organiza-
tional outsiders.42 This is known as the "private benefit," and differ-
ent authorities have formulated it in somewhat different ways.
The United States Tax Court has focused on whether an entity is
purposefully organized to confer excessive private benefit upon cer-
tain outsiders, such that conferring these benefits is part of the organi-
37. THE MACMILLAN DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 280-81 (David W. Pearce ed., 4th
ed. 1992) (defining "mixed good" as "[g]oods, the benefit of consuming which is neither confined
solely to one individual nor available equally to everyone").
38. Id. at 379 (A good is "rival" "[w]here one individual's consumption of [the] good reduces
the quantity available to others .... Rivalness is a characteristic of private goods which are thus
scarce and require a process of allocation.") (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 146 ("A beneficial externality ... raises the production or utility of the externally-
affected party. For example, a beekeeper may benefit neighbouring farmers by incidentally sup-
plying pollination services."). Because some people can enjoy these benefits without paying for
their provision, distress relief charities will presumably receive a socially suboptimal amount of
contributions. Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organization from
Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 72 (1981) (citation omitted). Subsidies for charita-
ble activities help overcome this "free rider" problem. See, e.g., id at n.65 ("The charitable de-
duction induces a substantially more generous flow of contributions to many donative nonprofits
than would otherwise be forthcoming.") (citation omitted).
40. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (2003).
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1069 (1989) ("[A]n organiza-
tion's conferral of benefits on disinterested persons may cause it to serve 'a private interest'
within the meaning of [Treasury Regulation] section 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii)."). Gen. Coun.
Memo. 39,862 (Nov. 21, 1991); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-14-040 IRS Letter Rulings No. 1257, LTR.
2001 14040 (Jan 10, 2001) (private foundation confers private benefit by providing an institu-
tional outside researching a commercial book with exclusive and free access to its archives). See




zation's raison d'etre.43  The IRS Chief Counsel, by contrast, has
formulated the private benefit doctrine in terms of whether an entity's
operations have the objective effect of conferring excessive private
benefits upon outsiders. The issue is whether "[a]ny private benefit
arising from a particular [organizational] activity" is "'incidental'...
to the overall public benefit achieved by the activity. . . . ,,44 The Chief
Counsel's view finds support in dictum by Judge Richard Posner in
United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Commissioner.45 That case involved
the United Cancer Council (UCC), a purported charity that paid $26
million to W&H, an unrelated for-profit fundraising firm, for its ser-
vices. 46 "Suppose," wrote Judge Posner:
that UCC was so irresponsibly managed that it paid W & H twice as
much for fundraising services as W & H would have been happy to
accept for those services, so that of UCC's $26 million in fundraising
expense $13 million was the equivalent of a gift to the fundraiser.
Then it could be argued that UCC was in fact being operated to a
significant degree for the private benefit of W & H, though not be-
cause it was the latter's creature. 47
Defining the private benefit doctrine along these lines, continues
Judge Posner, would permit the IRS "to deal with the problem of im-
provident or extravagant expenditures by a charitable organization
that do not, however, inure to the benefit of insiders. ' 48 Charitable
managers who dissipate the entity's assets in this way may also violate
their duty of care under state law. 49
The private benefit doctrine typically involves the flow of benefits
to outsiders other than the intended recipients of a charity's outputs. 50
43. In Am. Campaign Acad., 92 T.C. 1053, the court denied 501(c)(3) status to a school for
political campaign professionals on grounds that: (a) it was formed with a substantial purpose to
benefit Republican Party organizations and candidates, a noncharitable class; and (b) more than
an insubstantial part of its activities furthered this purpose, as evidenced by the fact that Repub-
lican entities and candidates employed nearly all of the school's graduates.
44. Gen. Couns. Mem., supra note 42, at 39,862. To avoid being excessive, these private bene-
fits must be incidental "in both a qualitative and quantitative sense to the overall public benefit
achieved by the activity .... Id.
45. 165 F.3d 1173 (7th Cir. 1999).
46. Id. This case appealed the United States Tax Court's ruling that the UCC was operated
for the private inurement of the fundraising firm, which kept 92% of what it raised on the UCC's
behalf. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed this ruling on grounds that
the firm was run by organizational outsiders who negotiated their contract with the UCC at
arm's length. It remanded the case for a determination as to whether the UCC conferred a
private benefit upon the fundraising firm. The IRS and UCC settled prior to retrial.
47. Id. at 1179.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1180.
50. Andrew Megosh et al., Private Benefit Under IRC 501(c)(3), 2001, at http:/www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-tege/topichOl.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2003). See Heutter & Friedlander, supra note 30,
at 239. See also Am. Campaign Acad., 92 T.C. at 1066 ("Occasional economic benefits flowing to
2003]
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A poverty or disaster relief organization, for example, is charitable
even though its activities directly benefit persons in financial dis-
tress. 51 These private benefits are not only permissible, they are "a
necessary concomitant of the activity that benefits the public at large;
in other words, the benefit to the public cannot be achieved without
necessarily benefiting [these] private individuals. ,52 The public benefit
consists of the positive externalities generated by the recipients' con-
sumption of the "mixed goods" provided by the charity. 53
Although it is unusual for a charity to confer excessive benefits on
its intended beneficiaries, this nevertheless occurs. Under the IRS's
formulation, private benefits are permissible only if inter alia "quan-
titatively" incidental or insubstantial when viewed in relation to the
overall public benefit conferred by the activity.54 A poverty relief or-
ganization that turns a handful of paupers into princes, so to speak,
might fail this test.55 At the outset, an indigent person's consumption
of the charity's outputs generates sufficient public benefit to justify
the special advantages the law accords charities. The magnitude of
these benefits diminishes, however, with each additional unit of out-
put the recipient consumes.56 At some point after the recipient's basic
needs have been met, the attendant public benefits are too trivial to
justify public subsidy for additional transfers to the individual.
persons as an incidental consequence of an organization pursuing exempt charitable purposes
will not generally constitute prohibited private benefits.") (citations omitted).
51. See, e.g., Am. Campaign Acad., 92 T.C. at 1073 ("[E]xempt educational organizations must
inherently confer private benefits on participating individuals ..." by "instructing or training
[them] for the purpose of improving or developing [their] capabilities.") (citation omitted); Aid
to Artisans, Inc., v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. 202, 215-16 (1978) (An organization's purchase of handi-
crafts from disadvantaged artisans did not impermissibly serve the artisans' private interests,
where such activity served a charitable purpose and class, i.e., to alleviate the economic hardship
of disadvantaged artisans in developing societies where handicrafts are central to the economy.).
52. Gen. Couns. Mem., 39,862 (Nov. 21, 1999). The IRS describes these benefits as "qualita-
tively incidental" to the organization's charitable activity.
53. See supra note 37.
54. Gen. Couns. Mem., 39,862.
55. In this connection, see In re Ashton's Charity, 54 Eng. Rep. 45 (1859), an 1859 English
case involving a charitable trust to provide six "almswomen" with £6 per annum apiece. After
the trust's corpus increased by £6,000, a judge applied some of the increase to other charitable
uses, instead of using all of it according to the trust's instructions. "I apprehend that the addi-
tions to the increase of almswomen must have some limit. . . . [Ihf this money were divided
amongst the almswomen, they would thereupon cease to be almswomen," and become "persons
from a higher rank [i.e., gentlewomen] receiving a considerable income." Id.
56. This is due to the phenomenon of diminishing marginal utility, "whereby it is assumed that
the additional utility attached to an extra unit of any good diminishes as more and more of that
good is purchased." See THE MACMILLAN DICtIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS, supra note 37,
at 106.
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C. Charity Law Encourages Charitable Giving and
Retaining Charitable Surplus
Charity law encourages people to make charitable gifts in a variety
of ways. 57 The most famous of these-the charitable contribution de-
duction-is relatively recent. Long before the deduction's debut in
1917,58 charity law encouraged giving by recognizing "that a donor
who attaches conditions to his gift has a right to have his intention
enforced," 59 and by authorizing the attorney general to bring suit to
enforce these conditions. 60
Chief Justice John Marshall recognized the importance of honoring
donor intent in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward.61 Here
he observed that "one great inducement to [charitable] gifts is the
conviction felt by the giver, that the disposition he makes of them is
immutable .... All such gifts are made in the pleasing, perhaps delu-
sive hope, that the charity will flow forever in the channel which the
givers have marked out for it.''62 By nourishing such hopes, charity
law can increase the satisfaction that donors derive from making char-
itable gifts. This in turn increases the likelihood that donors will
57. Various state and federal laws also encourage people to volunteer for charitable organiza-
tions. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1578,
1685-86 (1992) (survey of state statutes limiting director's liability); Volunteer Protection Act of
1997, Pub. L. 105-19, 111 Stat. 218 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14501 (2000)) (limiting the liability of
volunteers for harm negligently caused to others when acting in the scope of their
responsibilities).
58. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 36, at 849 ("The first charitable income tax deduc-
tion was enacted in 1917 as part of a tax bill that raised federal income tax rates to help finance
the costs of entering World War I.").
59. Lefkowitz v. Lebensfeld, 68 A.D.2d 488, 495-96 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (explaining "[t]he
theory underlying the power of the [a]ttorney [gleneral to enforce [charitable] gifts for a stated
purpose").
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §391 (1959). Id. § 348 cmt. f (The directors of a
charitable corporation have a duty, enforceable at the suit of the attorney general, to apply
unrestricted gifts to one or more of the charitable purposes for which the corporation is organ-
ized, and to use restricted gifts according to the restrictions.). Such suits may also be brought by
co-directors or co-trustees, and parties with a "special interest." Id. § 391 cmts. b, c. Donors
themselves generally lack standing to maintain such actions. See Herzog Found. v. Univ. of
Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995, 997 (Conn. 1997). Although the settlor or his heirs or personal repre-
sentatives cannot sue to compel compliance with the charitable trust's terms, they can maintain a
suit to recover the trust property by reverter or resulting trust on the theory that the charitable
trust has failed. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 cmt. f.
61. 17 U.S. 518, 647 (1819).
62. Id. In this decision, the Supreme Court invalidated an attempt by the State of New Hamp-
shire to wrest control over the corporation of Dartmouth College from its board of directors
(a.k.a., "trustees"), who were the duly selected successors of the College's founders. This deci-
sion restored the trustees' control back to the College and its assets, including gifts that donors
had entrusted with these trustees.
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devote some of their wealth to charitable gifts as opposed to, say, in-
tra-family gifts or personal consumption. 63
Charity law not only favors the entry of assets into charitable chan-
nels, but it also disfavors the exit of unused or "surplus" charitable
assets.64 Federal tax law, for example, requires entities applying for
501(c)(3) status to guarantee that upon their dissolution, their assets
will continue to be used for charitable or public purposes. 65 In a simi-
lar vein, common law courts developed a special doctrine for retaining
assets placed into charitable trusts. If a private trust's purposes can no
longer be pursued, courts may be obliged to let the trust fail and dis-
tribute its unused assets to the settlor or the settlor's successors in
interest.66 By contrast, if a charitable trust's specific purpose becomes
"impossible, impracticable, or illegal to carry out," courts are obliged
to sustain the trust if the donor "manifested a more general intention
to devote the property to charitable purposes. '67 In that case, the
gift's unused balance will be retained and reapplied to another chari-
table purpose-one "which falls within the [donor's] general charitable
intention," 68 or that "reasonably approximates" the gift's specific
charitable purpose.69 This is the doctrine known as cy pres, or "as
near (as possible). '70
The "impossible-impracticable-or-illegal" language suggests that cy
pres is only available when something prevents a specific charitable
purpose from being realized. This is not true. The doctrine may also
apply where a charitable gift's specific purpose has been fully accom-
63. See Jonathan R. Macey, Private Trusts for the Provision of Private Goods, 37 EMORY L.J.
295, 297 (1988). A strict policy of honoring donor intent also promotes economic efficiency,
Professor Macey argues, because the ability to "influenc[e] events and individuals after one's
death [by dictating how ones wealth is to be used] may provide a primary motivation for ac-
cumulating wealth during one's life." Id.
64. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. b (2003) ("[T]rust law ... favors an
interpretation that would sustain a charitable trust and avoid the return of trust property to the
settler or successors in interest.).
65. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(4) (as amended in 1990).
66. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 8.
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959). This donor is said to give with a gen-
eral charitable intent. Alternatively, the donor may have wished to aid the specific charitable
project designated by his gift and nothing else, in other words, give with specific charitable in-
tent. If so, then the gift fails and any unused balance is refunded to the settlor or donors. Id.
§ 413.
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399.
69. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67.
70. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399. Cy pres derives from the Norman French
term "cy pres comme possible," which means "as near as possible" or "so nearly as may be." In
re Pierce, 136 A.2d 510, 515 (Me. 1957); 15 AM. JUR. 2D Charities § 149 (2000).
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plished 7' or where the gift's purpose has ceased to be charitable. 72 In
these situations, the gift's unused balance is known as charitable
"surplus." 73
In theory, courts invoke the cy pres doctrine in order to implement
the donor's intentions.7 4 Yet, if the donors did not convey what they
wanted to happen in this contingency, courts may engage in "imagina-
tive reconstruction. '75 In the case of testamentary bequests, for ex-
ample, courts ostensibly ask "whether, had the testator known that it
would be impossible to follow the express terms of the charitable be-
quest, she would prefer to bequeath the funds to a similar charitable
purpose or have her largess be treated like all other ineffective be-
quests."' 76 As a matter of policy and practice, however, charity law
favors keeping the surplus in charitable channels.77 For this reason,
courts generally presume that donors give with general charitable in-
tent or purpose, and require the party opposing the application of cy
pres to negate the existence of such intent.78 As one commentator
71. Here too, the unusued balance can be applied to another charitable purpose if the donor
"manifested a more general intention to devote the whole of the trust property to charitable
purposes . . . ." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 cmt. k. See also Id. § 400.
72. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 8 cmt. g.
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 400.
74. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 33, § 436. The authors stated:
The reason given for the requirement of general charitable intent is that cy pres is
theoretically based on the enforcement by the court of an actually formed and ex-
pressed intent of the settlor, and that the selection of a secondary charitable objective is
not because the court thinks such a result desirable but rather because the donor de-
sired it.
Id.; 9 AM. JUR. 2D § 1 ("In applying the principle of cy pres, the court does not arbitrarily substi-
tute its own judgment for the desire of the settlor, or supply a fictional intent, but rather seeks to
ascertain and carry out as nearly as possible the settlor's true intention.").
75. Under the "imaginative reconstruction" approach to statutory interpretation,
the interpreter tries to discover 'what the law-maker meant by assuming his position, in
the surroundings in which he acted, and endeavoring to gather from the mischiefs he
had to meet and the remedy by which he sought to meet them, his intention with re-
spect to the particular point in controversy.
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 218-19
(2000) (quoting Roscoe Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 379, 381 (1907)).
76. 15 AM. JUR. 2D Charities § 154 (2000). This same approach readily applies to non-testa-
mentary gifts.
77. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. b ("[T]rust law ... favors an inter-
pretation that would sustain a charitable trust and avoid the return of the trust property to the
settlor or successors in interest.").
78. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 cmt. c
If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable purpose, and it is
provided by the terms of the trust that if the purpose should fail the trust should termi-
nate, the property will not be applied cy pres on the failure of the particular purpose,
since the terms of the trust negative the existence of a general charitable intention.
(emphasis added); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. b ("[W]hen the particular pur-
pose of a charitable trust fails, in whole or in part, the rule of this Section makes the cy pres
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observed several decades ago, "[t]he constant and ever increasing ef-
forts of courts and legislatures ... to sustain and support charitable
gifts has [sic] propelled the law of charities well along the path to-
wards establishment of a principle that property once given to charity
is forever dedicated to charity. '79
D. Charity Law and Charitable Relief for Injury Victims
In a 1999 text, the IRS explained how the private benefit doctrine
applies to the activities of 501(c)(3) organizations that provide relief
to disaster victims and "needy individuals who have encountered fi-
nancial hardship for reasons beyond their control. '80 These programs
typically supply recipients with financial or in-kind aid to meet their
basic needs for food, clothing, housing, transportation, medical or psy-
chological assistance, and the like. 81 In a crucial passage, the IRS text
stated that:
[m]aking an individual whole on account of a disaster or emergency
hardship does not, necessarily, further charitable purposes. The
amount needed to relieve the distress should be based on all the
facts and circumstances of the individual's situation and the char-
ity's resources. An outright transfer of funds based solely on an in-
dividual's involvement in a disaster or without regard to meeting
the individual's particular distress or financial needs would result in
private benefit. For example, if an individual's uninsured vacation
residence is destroyed in a disaster, that person would have under-
gone a loss. But, it does not follow that the person is therefore dis-
tressed and needy. Maintaining a person's standard of living at a
level satisfactory to that person rather than at a level to satisfy basic
needs could also serve private interests. For example, rebuilding an
individual's luxury estate would serve a private rather than a public
interest where meeting the individual's basic needs may be limited
solely to providing temporary housing. Similarly, grants to replace
lost income rather than to meet basic living needs would generally
be viewed as serving personal and private interests. 82
power applicable (thus presuming the existence of what is often called a general charitable pur-
pose) unless the terms of the trust . . . express a contrary intention.") (emphasis added); see
Macey, supra note 63 at 314 ("[C]y pres power appears to be a device for permitting judges,
through a finding that the settlor had a "general charitable purpose" when he created the trust,
to keep private funds in the public domain, even when the settlor's intent might have been to
have the assets revert back to the settlor's estate.").
79. Edith L. Fisch, Changing Concepts and Cy Pres, 44 CORNELL L .0. 382, 382 (1959).
80. See Huetter & Freidlander, supra note 30 at 220. The IRS published this article in the
annual Continuing Professional Education (CPE) course book that it provides to its agents.
These books are publicly available and well known to tax practitioners as a source of guidance.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 227.
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It is instructive to compare how charity law and tort law approach
the task of alleviating a disaster victim's losses. From a charitable per-
spective, victims are generally ineligible for long-term cash assistance
unless they are financially distressed. If the charity provides aid, it
focuses on what it will take to ensure that the victims' basic living
needs are met. In tort, by contrast, injury victims are entitled to com-
pensation if they suffer loss due to others' negligence; it does not mat-
ter whether the loss threatens P's financial well-being. D should
generally pay P a monetary sum (damages) "that leaves[s] her in the
same position that she would have enjoyed if she had not been made a
victim of D's wrong. '8 3 For charity law, on the other hand, there is
nothing intrinsically charitable about restoring the status quo ante. A
charity can confer excessive benefit, moreover, by making a victim
whole where less aid would suffice to meet P's basic needs.
The differences between charitable relief and tort compensation are
also reflected in how each approaches pain and suffering and other
forms of noneconomic harm.84 Assume that an electrical fire caused
by D burned P, but left no permanent scars. In a tort action against
D, P seeks and ultimately receives $500,000 in damages for the mental
distress and embarrassment P experienced due to the burn. This may
be entirely appropriate from a tort law perspective. No charity, by
contrast, would presently transfer funds to P, based solely on the
mental distress P suffered from her now healed burns. Rather, a char-
ity would focus on alleviating the current manifestations, if any, of
past harm. For P, this may entail counseling and other forms of
therapy.
A charity can prevent some private benefit by considering the bene-
fits an injury victim has or can receive from collateral sources. For
example, a family whose home was damaged by a natural disaster
"may not have the need for a low interest loan for home repair be-
cause its home is covered by insurance or it can reasonably obtain and
repay a commercial loan."'8 5 The charity that ignores these collateral
sources favors victims better able to help themselves to the detriment
of those who need help more urgently. This seems perverse and con-
trary to charitable principles.8 6
83. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 436 (1999).
84. See Act, supra note 3, § 402(7). The Act defines the term "noneconomic losses" to mean
"losses for physical and emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, mental
anguish, disfigurement, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of society and companionship, loss of con-
sortium (other than loss of domestic service), hedonic damages, injury to reputation, and all
other nonpecuniary losses of any kind or nature." Id.
85. Huetter & Freidlander, supra note 30 at 220.
86. See Katz, supra note 15, at 271-72.
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As compared to the all-purpose or general charity, the charity
formed in response to a specific calamity is more likely to confer ex-
cessive benefit.87 Such a charity's purposes may be fully accomplished
once the basic needs of a specific set of victims have been met. At this
point, any unexpended funds in the entity's coffers may constitute a
surplus. Under federal tax law and common law cy pres, this surplus
should generally be redeployed to a related charitable purpose. As
stated by the IRS's 1999 text:
An organization formed for a particular disaster or for a limited
duration should have a plan for distribution of excess funds at the
termination of the organization's existence in a manner consistent
with the dissolution requirements under IRC 501(c)(3). For exam-
ple, once the basic necessities have been met, excess funds must be
distributed to qualified charities or to the federal, state or local gov-
ernment for a public purpose. Excess funds can not be prorated
among the victims. 88
As the foregoing suggests, charity law curtails the donor who seeks
to enrich (as opposed to relieve) a specific group of injury victims.
Gifts cannot be used to confer excessive private benefit, even if some
donors actually intended this result. In any event, charity law
presumes that charitable donors do not intend to confer excessive pri-
vate benefit. If donors do not clearly state their supra-charitable or
noncharitable preference for distributing their gifts' surplus, then any
such surplus will most likely be applied according to the principles of
cy pres.8 9 Note that such donors can still use noncharitable (and non-
deductible) vehicles to provide surpra-charitable sums to a specific
group of victims, for example, by making direct gifts or by creating
private trusts.
The next two sections explore the consequences of the foregoing
charity law principles and practices for tort law and the Fund,
respectively.
87. See e.g., BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 33 § 363 ("If the beneficiaries consist of a definite
group and are not to receive additions to their number, a private trust may serve them as well as
a charitable trust.")
88. See Huetter & Friedlander, supra note 30 at 226 ("Plan for Distribution of Excess
Funds").
89. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 432 cmt. b (1957) (If the settlor of an
initially charitable trust wants any surplus transferred to a private trust for noncharitable pur-
poses, the settlor must properly manifest this intention.). Cf. Katz, supra note 15 at 274-75 (dis-
cussing Doyle v. Whalen, 32 A. 1022 (Me. 1895)) (ordering surplus charitable funds raised for
the relief of victims of Eastport, Maine, fire of 1886, to be distributed as a private trust for the
benefit of the sufferers of the fire, for example, by indemnifying their uninsured losses, after
determining that the donors would likely have wanted the surplus to be distributed this way).
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III. CHARITY LAW AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
FOR TORT LAW OF DAMAGES
This section examines tort law's approach to charitable gifts and
criticizes it from a charity law perspective. It first explains how the
tort system compensates the injury victim (P) whose losses have been
partly alleviated by charitable gifts. It focuses on the collateral source
rule, which permits the prevailing P to retain the benefits of charitable
gifts and collect damages, including make-whole damages, from the
tortfeaser (D). The second part criticizes tort law, especially the col-
lateral source rule, for facilitating the use of charitable assets to confer
excessive private benefit on P. The third part critiques the theories of
donor intent and moral desert sometimes advanced to justify tort
law's approach to charitable gifts. It compares these to charity law's
more nuanced and satisfactory account of donor intent. The final part
explores charity law's normative implications for tort law. It argues
that the tort system should, where feasible, seek to recover the value
of charitable gifts from the compensated P and reapply it to charitable
purposes.
A. The Collateral Source Rule
When P suffers harm due to D's negligence, D must pay P damages
"that leave [P] in the same position that she would have enjoyed if she
had not been made a victim of D's wrong." 90 Ideally, making D pay
this sum not only compensates P; it also deters D and other would-be
tortfeasors from engaging in socially excessive amounts of risky be-
havior. 9' These damages can also be understood in moral terms as
"restor[ing] the pre-existing relationship between the two parties, a
relationship that was unjustly disturbed by one party's misconduct and
the resulting injury to the other. ' 92 In the ideal case, therefore, tort
90. EPSTEIN, supra note 83, at 436. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 903 cmt. a
(1965) (damages calculated to leave "in a position substantially equivalent in a pecuniary way to
that which [s]he would have occupied had no tort been committed").
91. See, e.g., Gypsum Carrier, Inc. v. Handelsman, 307 F.2d 525, 534 (9th Cir. 1962) (The
collateral source rule serves, inter alia, "to deter negligence and encourage due care."); RICHARD
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 219 (5th ed. 1998); 2 A.L.I., REPORTERS' STUDY:
ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY: APPROACHES TO LEGAL AND INSTITU-
TIONAL CHANGE 161-62 (1991). Some question whether the rule has a significant impact on
deterrence. See, e.g., 4 FOWLER V. HARPER, ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.22, at 658 (2d ed.
1986) ("Altogether it seems unlikely indeed that [a defendant's] anticipation of... an abatement
from the flexible and indeterminate damages in a tort action [to account for plaintiff's collateral-
source benefits] will materially dilute whatever admonitory value there is in civil liability" to
take care.).
92. 1 A.L.L. supra note 91, at 25.
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law achieves three goals simultaneously: it makes P whole; it optimally
deters D; and it settles moral accounts between the two parties.
Collateral source benefits can interfere with the tort system's ability
to balance its competing objectives. Assume P suffers $10,000 in
losses in a fire caused by D, and receives a charitable gift of $1,000 to
meet immediate needs. How, if at all, should the $1,000 gift affect P's
damages in any tort action that P later brings against D? On one
hand, P only needs $9,000 from D to be made whole. Yet, if the
$1,000 gift reduces D's liability from $10,000 to $9,000, then D pays
less than the full social costs of his conduct and is underdeterred. Ad-
ditionally, moral reconciliation between P and D will not be fully
achieved. On the other hand, if the court sets damages at $10,000, it
effectively permits P to collect a total of $11,000 in injury-related pay-
ments from all sources. This result seems to violate the principle that
damages should compensate P for her losses but no more,93 even as it
optimally deters D and more fully reconciles D and P.
Tort law errs on the side of overcompensating P. Under the collat-
eral source rule, D must pay damages to P without regard to any pay-
ments or benefits that P receives from collateral sources for the same
losses.94 There are several responses to the overcompensation con-
cern.95 In some cases, no overcompensation occurs because P is con-
tractually obliged to reimburse the collateral source out of any
damages or settlement obtained from D. 96 In other cases, P receives a
double recovery but it is not a windfall, defined as "economic gains
independent of work, planning, or other productive activities that so-
93. See 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 566 (1988) ("[I]f the basic goal of tort law is only that of
compensating plaintiff for his losses, evidence of these benefits [from collateral sources] should
be admitted to reduce the total damages assessed against the defendant."); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS, § 920A cmt. b (1965) ("[T]he injured party's net loss may have been reduced
correspondingly [by her receipt of collateral benefits], and to the extent that the defendant is
required to pay the total amount [of her losses] there may be a double compensation for a part
of the plaintiff's injury"); 2 A.L.I., supra note 91, at 162 & n.2 (citing sources that criticize the
collateral source rule as unjust).
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 920A(2); see supra note 91.
95. I do not address the argument that the collateral source rule is a more or less appropriate
(albeit indirect) way of counterbalancing the effects of the "American Rule" that each party in a
civil action must pay its own attorney's fees. If the successful plaintiff must pay a sizable portion
of her recovery to her attorney, then the plaintiff whose damage awards equals her losses will be
undercompensated. See, e.g., Helfend v. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 61, 68-69 (Cal. 1970)
(The collateral source rule serves the desirable function of helping to overcome the disadvantage
to P resulting from the usual attorney's contingent fee contract.).
96. See, e.g., Helfend, 465 P.2d at 65 (The fact that a portion of plaintiff's medical bills had
been paid through a medical insurance plan "does not present a danger of double recovery"
because plan requires plaintiff to refund benefits from tort recoveries.); 2 A.L.I. supra note 91, at
163-64 (citation omitted). This arrangement is known as "conventional subrogation." RICHARD
H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 708-09 (3d ed. 2002).
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ciety wishes to reward." 97 For example, P may have paid a higher
insurance premium in exchange for not having to reimburse the in-
surer out of any tort recovery.98 More broadly, P is seen as entitled to
collateral benefits for which she gave consideration. Even if the col-
lateral benefit is very large relative to P's consideration, courts apply
the collateral source rule in order to reward P for her thrift and fore-
sight in arranging for the benefit in advance, and to encourage others
to do the same.99
Most courts also apply the collateral source rule to benefits that
were rendered gratuitously to P, rather than pursuant to a contract.10°
Where P suffers $10,000 in economic losses due to D and receives a
$1,000 charitable gift, P can still collect the full $10,000 in damages
from D. Similarly, if P receives $1,000 in free medical care from a
nonprofit hospital, P can recover the value of the free care she re-
ceived, in addition to the $10,000 losses she suffered directly. 101
At least four jurisdictions, however, would apply the collateral
source rule only to benefits that P has earned in some way.10 2 In Pe-
terson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co.,10 3 the Illinois Supreme Court
held that the plaintiff could not recover the value of medical services
necessitated by the defendant's negligence when such services had
been rendered at no charge by a charitable hospital. "[T]he policy
behind the collateral-source rule," the court declared, "simply is not
applicable if the plaintiff has incurred no expense, obligation, or liabil-
ity in obtaining the services for which he seeks compensation.' 0 4 The
purpose of tort damages, it continued, is to compensate plaintiffs for
their losses-not to confer a windfall upon them nor to punish (a.k.a.,
97. Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J. 1489, 1491 (1999).
98. See POSNER, supra note 91, at 201.
99. Helfend, 465 P.2d at 66 ("The collateral source rule expresses a policy judgment in favor of
encouraging citizens to purchase and maintain insurance for personal injuries and for other
eventualities.").
100. RESTATATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 920A cmt. c(3) (1965).
101. In the conclusion, I note that a charitable organization can provide its benefits as a condi-
tional gift that requires reimbursement only if P later obtains compensation for the same losses
from another source.
102. See, e.g., Fla. Physician's Ins. Reciprocal v. Stanley, 452 So.2d 514, 515 (Fla. 1984); Peter-
son v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 392 N.E.2d 1 (Il. 1979); Evans v. Pa. R.R. Co., 255 F.2d 205,
210 (3d Cir. 1958) (Under Delaware law, a plaintiff cannot recover amount "representing a re-
duction by his doctors in the size of their bill rendered him due to his impecunious circum-
stances."); Coyne v. Campbell, 183 N.E.2d 891 (N.Y. 1962). After September 11th, New York
amended its collateral source statute to prohibit tortfeasors from introducing evidence of chari-
table gifts received by the injured party. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4545(d) (McKinney 1993).
103. 392 N.E.2d 1.




"deter") defendants. 10 5 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Florida as-
serted that "the common-law collateral source rule should be limited
to those benefits earned in some way by the plaintiff," and should not
be used to give "an undeserved and unnecessary windfall to the plain-
tiff."'10 6 To avoid a windfall to P, these courts use P's third-party gra-
tuities to reduce D's liability. (They generally do not address whether
this approach confers a windfall on D.)
B. The Collateral Source Rule Is Problematic as Applied
to Charitable Gifts
Although both charitable organizations and the tort system disburse
cash to injury victims to alleviate their losses, this activity looks very
different from the perspective of charity law as opposed to tort law.
Charity law governs the use of charitable assets, primarily by charita-
ble organizations, to relieve an injury victim's financial distress in her
hour of need. Tort law provides P with a process (often protracted)
for obtaining compensation for her losses from the responsible party,
whether she objectively needs the compensation or not. On first
blush, each domain might appear to operate independently of the
other. They overlap, however, when P seeks damages for losses al-
ready alleviated by payments from charitable organizations. Tort
law's approach to charitable gifts for the same losses permits recipi-
ents to use these gifts to increase their long-term wealth regardless of
financial need. Stated differently, this licenses the use of charitable
assets to confer an excessive private benefit.
Consider Gifts for the Injured and Financially Troubled (GIFTS), a
hypothetical charity formed to disburse one-time gifts of $1,000 to in-
jury victims in financial distress. Although most of its victims are sim-
ply unlucky, some have injuries caused by another person's
negligence. Assume that two economically self-sufficient persons, P
and Q, each suffer a $10,000 injury due to D's and E's negligence,
respectively. Each victim promptly files suit against his or her
tortfeasor. With unprecedented swiftness, Q obtains a make-whole
judgment of $10,000 from E. If Q then applies to GIFTS for a $1,000
grant, the charity cannot assist him without conferring excessive pri-
105. Id. at 13-14.
106. Stanley, 452 So.2d at 515 (When a plaintiff seeks to recover the costs of future services
necessitated by the defendants' negligence, the collateral source rule does not prevent the jury




vate benefit. 0 7 P's lawsuit, by contrast, languishes in motions and dis-
covery, while P has difficulty meeting her basic needs. It is perfectly
appropriate for GIFTS to give P a $1,000 grant.
After three years, a jury determines that D caused P's $10,000 in-
jury and a court must set damages. Here, it may help to see the $1,000
grant as being distributed in two stages. The first stage occurs after P
receives the grant and before she collects damages. GIFTS lets P use
the $1,000 during this stage, when it helps to alleviate her financial
distress. P's usage of the $1,000 during this stage provides P with a
real economic benefit, as P is not indifferent between: (a) receiving
the entire $1,000 during stage one as Q did; and (b) receiving the
$1,000 plus three years' accrued interest at stage two. 10 8 The second
distribution occurs when the court awards damages. In the second
stage the court decides how GIFTS' prior grant will affect P's dam-
ages. This decision effectively determines the ultimate recipient of the
balance of GIFTS' prior grant to P, which consists of $1,000 dis-
counted by, say, the interest it would have earned while the lawsuit
was pending. 10 9 Even if P is not its ultimate recipient in stage two, P
retains the benefits the gift produced during stage one.
If the court follows the minority rule, it will reduce D's liability (and
P's recovery) from $10,000 to $9,000, which effectively gives D the
$1,000 grant (as discounted). From a charity law perspective, this is
unacceptable because enriching D serves no charitable purpose."t 0
The majority rule-to confer the grant's long-term benefits on P-is
more complicated because the charitableness of helping P has
changed over time. GIFTS' initial distribution to P during stage one
was undeniably charitable. Yet, if the damages that P collects through
litigation suffice to alleviate P's distress, then P is no longer a charity
case. As was true of 0, if P were now to approach GIFTS for the first
time, the organization could not give her a $1,000 grant without con-
ferring excessive private benefit. The majority rule effectively
achieves this same result by awarding P $10,000 in damages while
leaving the $1,000 grant where it lies.
107. Q may be an inappropriate recipient of GIFTS' aid even if he or she collects less than
$10,000 from D, so long as the compensation alone (that is, after being reduced by the $1,000
gift) suffices to relieve Q's financial distress.
108. In economic terms, we would say that P had a positive rate of time preference-she
valued units of consumption during her financial hardship more highly than the same number of
units consumed after the hardship had passed. Perhaps she feared that she might not survive in
order to enjoy future benefits. See THE MACMILLAN DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS,
supra note 37, at 428-29. (defining "time preference").
109. Id. at 108 (defining "discount rate").
110. Nor was it likely the intention of GIFTS' donors, but more on that below. See infra note
118 and accompanying text.
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C. Tort Law's Problematic Account of Donor Intent
and Moral Desert
The collateral source rule is not only problematic from a charity law
perspective, it also runs counter to the tort law principle that
"[c]ompensation does not mean overcompensation.""' On this view,
damages should make P whole but not more so. Some courts have
been especially reluctant to apply the collateral source rule to "gratui-
tous" collateral benefits, as opposed to those that P has "earned"
through her work, planning, or other productive activities that society
wishes to reward.11 2
Courts and commentators defend applying the collateral source rule
to gratuities-even if this makes P more than whole-on two main
grounds: (a) this result effectuates the intent of the donors of P's
gift;113 and (b) if there must be a windfall, P deserves it more than
D.114 This section examines tort law's account of donor intent and sug-
gests that it may be accurate and appropriate, or both, for donors who
transfer sums directly to another definite and specifically-identified in-
dividual. Charity law, however, offers a more compelling account of
the intentions of persons who contribute to charitable organizations.
1. Tort Law's Account of Donor Intent
In our hypothetical, P incurs $10,000 in losses caused by D, which
prompts a collateral source to give $1,000 in cash to P. In the short-
term, the donor undoubtedly intended to help relieve P's immediate
suffering. 115 But how did this donor intend his gift to affect P-or the
world at large-in the long-term? More specifically, how did this do-
nor intend his gift to affect the damages awarded in any tort action
that P might bring against D? In most cases, one suspects, the donor
helped P without giving much thought to the possibility that she might
recover from a tortfeasor. The donor may, thus, not have formu-
111. TONY WEIR, TORT LAW 188 (2002).
112. These earned benefits are the opposite of what Professor Kades defines as windfalls. See
Kades, supra note 97, at 1491.
113. The underlying assumption is that public policy favors giving effect to donor intent, and
that courts can and should advance this policy goal even when awarding tort damages.
114. See, e.g., 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 566 (1988) ("If there must be a windfall, it is usually
considered more just that the injured person should profit, rather than let the wrongdoer be
relieved of full responsibility for his wrongdoing.").
115. I am using the term "donor" to refer to both (a) persons who contribute to a charitable
organization, which in turn distributes sums to recipients; and (b) persons who transfer sums
directly to recipients, unmediated by an organized charity. I discuss those donors separately
below. See infra notes 135-138
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lated-or at least did not express-an intention as to his gift's effect
on P's recovery.11 6
If the donor did not formulate or express a long-term intent, then
the court must attempt to deduce how he would have wanted his gift
to affect P's recovery from D, had he considered the scenario. Con-
sider three possibilities: (1) the donor intended to be repaid out of any
damages; 17 (2) the donor intended the gift to augment whatever re-
covery P might collect from D-thereby authorizing P to use his gift
to increase her long-term wealth; or (3) the donor intended his gift to
reduce D's liability to P. We can reject the third option out of hand: it
is safe to assume that the donor did not want (or would not have
wanted) his gift to benefit D at any point.118 The issue then becomes:
whom did the donor want to enjoy the long-term benefits of his initial
emergency outlay of $1,000-P or himself? The collateral source rule
is consistent with the view that the donor intended (or would have
intended) P to enjoy his gift's long-term benefits.
In Arambula v. Wells,"19 a California appellate court invoked donor
intent to support its award of lost earnings to an injury victim (P),
even though P's employer (who was also his brother) paid his salary
during his alleged period of disability, and P had no legal duty to re-
pay his employer out of his damage award. The court held that the
collateral source rule applies to "gratuitous payments (including mon-
eys to cover lost wages) by family or friends to assist tort victims
through difficult times. ' 120 "Charitable contributions," 121 said the
Arambula court, "are primarily motivated by the intended use to
which donations are put. Under these circumstances, we logically turn
to the intent of the donors. Whom did they intend to help when they
gratuitously agreed to cover lost wages? The person who caused the
accident? Or the victim?11 2 2 By honoring the intent of P's benefac-
tors in setting damages, the court was "adher[ing] to the rule to pro-
mote policy concerns favoring private charitable assistance. 1 123 The
116. See HARPER ET AL., supra note 91, at 663. Accord Richard Lewis, Deducting Collateral
Benefits from Damages: Principle and Policy, LEGAL STUDIES, Mar. 1998, at 15, 28.
117. Cf. Arambula v. Wells, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 584, 585 (Ct. App. 1999) (Holding no setoff for
gratuitous wages paid to plaintiff by his brother, where "brother 'wished' to be reimbursed, but
[plaintiff] had not promised to do so.").
118. See Lewis, supra note 116, at 15, 28 (No charitable donor "intends to subsidise the
tortfeasor" who injured the beneficiary with the donor's largesse.).
119. 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 584.
120. Id. at 585.
121. Note that the court uses the term "charitable contributions" to refer to, inter alia, private
gifts from one's family members, employers or both. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.




court would impede this policy, by contrast, by using the gratuitous
benefits received by P to reduce D's liability. Donors would feel as
though their largesse had been "hijacked by the tortfeasor, ' '124 and
they would be less willing to help others in need. "We doubt such gifts
would continue," the Arambula court concluded, "if, notwithstanding
a donor's desire to aid the injured, the person who caused the injury
ultimately stood to gain a windfall. ' 125 A British judge has expressed
the same fear with more flair:
[i]t would be revolting to the ordinary man's sense of justice, and
therefore contrary to public policy, that the sufferer should have his
damages reduced so that he would gain nothing from the benevo-
lence of his friends or relations or of the public at large, and that the
only gainer would be the wrongdoer. 126
If a court must either leave a gift's long-term benefits with P or shift
these to D, there may be good reasons to prefer P. But what if the
long-term benefits must either stay with P or return to the donor?
Should tort law assume that (1) the donor intended to be repaid out of
P's recovery, such that D would recapture the gift's long-term bene-
fits, or (2) the donor intended his gift to augment P's recovery from
D? The latter assumption may make sense, I believe, for private gifts
one receives directly from relatives,12 7 friends, 128 fellow members of
an association, 129 a for-profit employer, 130 and the like, as opposed to
gifts received from a charitable organization. The view is based on the
observation that people typically make private gifts to specific persons
with whom they have an established relationship, and that these rela-
tionships may embody or express moral commitments, emotional at-
tachments, kindred ties, and such. "In these cases of private
generosity," a leading treatise sagely concludes, "the best solution
124. Id. at 589; see supra note 118.
125. Id. at 588-89.
126. Parry v. Cleaver, 1 ALL E.R. 555, 558 (H.L. 1969).
127. See. e.g., Arambula, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 584 (Where plaintiff worked in company owned by
his brother, collateral source rule permitted plaintiff to recover for lost wages voluntarily paid by
brother during period of his disability.).
128. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 570 (1988) (citation omitted).
129. See. e.g., Local 1140, International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v.
Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 165 N.W.2d 234 (Minn. 1969) (Plaintiffs were entitled to monetary
reimbursement from medical insurer for value of blood they received without financial expense
from blood donors club to which plaintiffs belonged, where plaintiffs gave up blood bank credits
in "payment" for the blood received.).
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 920A cmt. c(2) (1965) (P can recover for lost
wages during period of incapacity, even though P's "employer, although not legally required to
do so, continues to pay the employee's wages during his incapacity"); Bachelder v. Morgan, 60
So. 815 (Ala. 1912) (Where P received a donation from employer during period of disability, the
amount of such donation could not be used to reduce the damages for which D was liable.).
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seems to be a rule of thumb that would give greatest scope to the
donor's generosity and to the adjustment of moral obligations within
the more or less intimate relationships that usually bring such gener-
osity into play. The private gift should be disregarded in assessing
damages." 131 Even if the donor did expect repayment out of P's re-
covery, he or she is better off if P rather than D receives the long term
benefits. By overcompensating P, the court places P "in possession of
the means to enable him to return the money [to the donor] volunta-
rily, if in conscience he should see proper to do so." ' 132
Alternatively, a private gift may occur within the context of a long-
term cooperative relationship between the donor and P for their mu-
tual advantage. According to Professor Eric Posner, the partners in
such relationships sometimes make transfers that look "gift-like" inso-
far as they do "not explicitly call for a reciprocal transfer .... ,,133 In
the broader scheme, however, these transfers "occur as part of the
loose quid pro quo in a trust relationship" and, thus, "are not really
gifts at all."' 134 If this account is sound, then courts should not pre-
sume that the transferor expected an immediate and enforceable re-
payment out of P's damages. Rather, these parties have yoked
themselves together for the long-haul and rely mainly on nonlegal
mechanisms to make their interactions mutually advantageous. The
"gift" should stay with P.
2. Charity Law's Account of Donor Intent
As applied to gratuities, the collateral source rule implicitly assumes
that donors either intend or do not mind enriching the P who receives
their gift. This assumption, I argue, is more applicable to the donors
of private gifts than charitable gifts. This is not surprising given that
tort law tends to lump private gifts and charitable gifts into a single
category-"gratuities" or "gratuitous" benefits.135 One even sees the
131. See HARPER ET AL.., supra note 91, at 663.
132. Klein v. Thompson, 19 Ohio St. 569, 571 (1869) (permitting plaintiff to recover medical
expenses covered by town trustees, even though "the trustees may have no right to recover the
amount paid from the plaintiff"). See also Arambula, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 589 ("Even without an
ironclad requirement of reimbursement, the plaintiff may be motivated to repay the donor from
any tort recovery ... ").
133. ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 54 (2000).
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., Dahlin v. Kron, 45 N.W.2d 833, 838 (Minn. 1950) ("[Tjhe defendant cannot take
advantage of the fact that the doctor's bill and expenses were paid for the plaintiff by a beneficial
society, by members of his family, by his employer, or by other persons"); HARPER ET AL.. supra
note 91, at 661-63 (in discussion of tort law of damages' treatment of "gifts," there is no refer-
ence in the text to aid from charitable organizations); Richard C. Maxwell, The Collateral Source
Rule in the Anierican Law of Damages, 46 MINN. L. REV. 669, 687-88 (1962); 22 AM. JUR. 2D
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terms "charity" and "charitable" used to refer to private gifts. 13 6 Tort
law's undifferentiated approach to "gratuitous" collateral benefits is
reflected in its account of donor intent: it has no special account of
how charitable donors, as opposed to private donors, likely intended
(or would have intended) their donations to affect P's tort action
against D.
Charity law prohibits a donor from earmarking his or her gift for a
specific or pre-selected person. Instead, the donor's contribution must
be dedicated to benefiting a large or significant class of persons who
share a certain characteristic, for example, the poor, elderly, or stu-
dents. These strictures make it more difficult for a charitable donor to
use gifts to a charitable entity to cultivate or strengthen an ongoing
personal relationship with any particular recipient. As a result, the
charitable donor is more inclined (as compared to the private donor)
to see the gift's recipients as fungible. There is less reason for this
donor to seek to enrich any particular class member to the detriment
of other members.
As a doctrinal matter, charity law offers a more sophisticated, and
ultimately more satisfying, account of the typical charitable donor's
likely intentions. This account applies most directly to a charitable or-
ganization's use of charitable assets. Under the doctrine of cy pres,
charity law effectively presumes that: (a) the donor intended his gift to
be used, in the first instance, for the specific purpose he designated;
but (b) if and when that purpose is fully accomplished or has ceased to
be charitable, the donor presumably wanted the gift's unused balance
(a.k.a., the "surplus") to be reapplied to a related charitable pur-
pose.137 Charity law generally does not presume, by contrast, that
these donors wanted the surplus distributed to P for her private bene-
fit, unrelated to her financial needs, or returned to the donors
themselves.
This account of donor intent readily carries over to the tort dam-
ages context. When GIFTS gave P a $1,000 grant, its short-term goal
(and, by implication, its donors' goal) was to relieve P's financial dis-
tress due to the $10,000 injury caused by D. By the time P receives
Damages § 570 (1988) (discussing collateral source rule's applicability to "gratuities" without
specifically mentioning gifts from charitable organizations).
136. See, e.g., Maxwell, supra note 135, at 687 & n.73 (citing Ostmo v. Tennyson, 296 N.W. 541
(N.D. 1941)) ("Charity" was used to refer to a transaction in which a car dealership took back a
damaged truck without any deduction for the damage.); Arambula v. Wells, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 584
(Ct. App. 1999) ("charity" used to refer to wages paid to victim during period of disability).
137. Stated differently, charity law effectively (if quietly) presumes that people who make




her $10,000 damage award, the prior grant's specific charitable pur-
pose-to relieve P's financial distress-has been fully accomplished.
Although P has likely spent the specific dollars, the grant is still "on
the books," so to speak. P's damage award for $10,000-$1,000 more
than P needs to be made whole-creates a $1,000 surplus that corre-
sponds to GIFTS' prior grant. To ascertain how GIFTS' donors would
have wanted this surplus distributed, we surmise their response to the
following question: "Now that P's losses have been fully compensated
from another source, do you want your gift to continue to benefit P, or
would you prefer your gift to benefit persons who have suffered simi-
lar injuries but, unlike P, have not been compensated by others?"' 38
Tort law assumes that the donors would want the former, while charity
law assumes that they would want the latter.
From a charity law perspective, the extra $1,000 in P's damage
award looks very much like a surplus ready to be reapplied, A la cy
pres, to a related charitable purpose. The cy pres doctrine (as applied)
almost irrebutably presumes that GIFTS' donors desired such reappli-
cation in these circumstances. Here, the most obvious substitute pur-
pose would be to relieve other injury victims who, unlike P, still suffer
from financial distress. As a moral matter, charity law-unlike tort
law-does not see charitable gifts as a windfall to be distributed to
either P or D. Rather, it recognizes a third party more deserving than
either-the still-needy intended recipients of assistance from GIFTS
and its donors.
D. What Is To Be Done?
Charity law has unmistakable normative implications for how the
tort system should compensate injury victims who have already re-
ceived charitable gifts to alleviate some of the same losses. Tort law
should neither ignore these gifts nor use them to reduce D's liability.
Instead, it should attempt to recover the value of these gifts and reap-
ply it to charitable purposes related to the gifts' original purposes.
Precisely when and how such recoupment should be attempted is an-
other matter, one that I cannot comprehensively resolve here. I can,
however, discuss a few possibilities. 39
138. See Lewis, supra note 116, at 28.
139. Note that some states have enacted legislation allocating a portion of any punitive dam-
ages awarded in civil actions to other public uses. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-51-3-6 (West 1999)
(75% of any punitive damage award entered in a civil action must be deposited in a compensa-
tion fund for the victims of violent crime). Their experiences with such statutes must be consid-
ered before embarking on any major initiative along the lines discussed here.
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The court might direct D to pay the full costs of P's injury (e.g., D
pays $10,000 for the electrical fire), but reduce P's award by the
amount of charitable gifts received (e.g., P gets $10,000 minus the
prior grant of $1,000 from GIFTS), with the balance paid to GIFTS.
Alternatively, the court might award P the full costs of her injury (i.e.,
$10,000, but subject to an undertaking and direction to return $1,000
to the charity).' 40 From a charity law perspective, this approach pre-
vents P's enrichment with virtual charitable assets-the $1,000 surplus
in P's damage award, which corresponds to the prior grant from
GIFTS. As a policy matter, it increases the efficacy of charitable dol-
lars by recycling them, that is, by transferring them from past recipi-
ents who no longer need them to persons who currently do need them.
One drawback to this approach is that it creates a gap between P's
incentives to sue (P will only recover $9,000) and the sum we want D
to pay ($10,000). As a result, plaintiffs may have insufficient incentive
to bring the socially optimal amount of negligence actions. There is
also the practical concern that the parties may simply contract around
a court's attempt to recover a charity's prior outlays to the plaintiff.
In our hypothetical, for example, D and P may settle the case for
$9,500; this saves each litigant $500 but eliminates the $1,000 that
might have been returned to GIFTS.
How actively should a court try to recover prior charitable gifts?
The answer depends on a variety of factors, including P's financial
stability (no recoupment if it leads to P's financial distress) and the
size of the charity's gift. A larger gift makes recoupment more worth-
while, naturally, relative to the transaction costs. 14 1 If P is presently
unable to repay the charity, the gift is small, or the relative transaction
costs are high, then the court might consider simply exhorting P to
repay the charity when able and obtain a promise from P to do so, or
both. 142
This project's success cannot be measured solely by the amount of
dollars recouped. Tort law can do more than simply help individual
charities reclaim some dollars that compensated plaintiffs might have
otherwise used for self-enrichment. Ideally, the tort system can pro-
mote the practice and spirit of what has been called "serial reciproc-
140. See, e.g., Coderre v. Ethier, 19 O.R.(2d) 503, § 34 (Ont. Sup. Ct. 1978) (where P's medical
expenses voluntarily paid by a third party, court awarded P damages for such expenses "subject
to an undertaking and a direction by the plaintiff ... to return them to the gratuitous donors").
141. See, e.g., id. ("In view of the magnitude of the nursing aid services" donated to P by her
religious order, court awards damages to P for the value of such services subject to an undertak-
ing and a direction by P to repay the donors) (emphasis added).
142. See KEN COOPER-STEPHENSON. New Solutions for the Collateral Benefits Problem, in RE-
CENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF DAMAGES 81, 99 (1991).
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ity."'1 43 This concept involves a series of transfers in which the current
recipients of charitable assistance later becomes donors, motivated in
part by a sense of duty toward their benefactors, which they express
by emulating their charitable activity. This response is often in keep-
ing with the spirit of the original gift. 144 A movie from a few years ago
expressed the same idea with the phrase "pay it forward."
Tort law's approach to charitable gifts in setting damages is uncon-
genial if not inimical to serial reciprocity. Tort law implicitly teaches
recipients that their donors wanted them to use their gifts to enrich
themselves, unrelated to need, and that they deserve such enrichment.
Such recipients, one expects, are less likely to "pay forward" the be-
nevolence they received. This need not be the case. If nothing else,
courts can exhort prevailing plaintiffs to repay the charities that as-
sisted them while their suits were pending. Courts can use their moral
authority to encourage these recipients to become donors.
IV. CHARITY LAW AND THE FUND
Charitable organizations distributed more than $800 million directly
to the injured and survivorst 45-more than $ 266,800 on average 146 for
each person killed on September 11th. Congress created the Fund to
provide compensation awards to roughly the same persons147-an av-
erage of $1.67 million per claimant. 148 The simultaneous operation of
these two systems of alleviating September 11th losses raised a very
practical question about their interaction: Would the Fund program
reduce claimants' awards by the amount of charitable gifts they had
received? 149 Because of the unprecedented charitable response to
143. See generally Michael P. Moody, Pass It On: Serial Reciprocity as a Principle of Philan-
thropy, in ESSAYS ON PHILANTHROPY, No. 13, Indiana University Center on Philanthropy
(1998).
144. See id. at 10-11.
145. SEESSEL, supra note 2, at 15.
146. The September 11th attacks claimed the lives of 2, 976 victims: 2,752 at the World Trade
Center; 184 at the Pentagon; and 40 on Flight 92 in Pennsylvania. See Dan Barry, About New
York: A New Account of Sept. 11 Loss, with 40 Fewer Souls To Mourn, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2003
at Al, see also http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/metro/specialslattacked/victims/viclist.
html (last visited Nov. 5, 2003); http:/lwww.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/
remebrance/vic list.html#pa (last visited Nov. 5, 2003).
147. Act, supra note 3, § 403.
148. As of November 4, 2003, the Special Master had issued 1,102 awards. The average award
was $1,666,281 per decedent, after mandatory offsets for life insurance, pensions, and other con-
tractual or statutory entitlements-but not charitable gifts. The median award after offsets was
$1,308,413. See http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/payments-deceased.html (last visited
Nov. 5, 2003).
149. One can also consider the same matter from the charities' perspective: To what extent
should the prospect of Fund awards have affected the activities of September 11th charitable
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September 11th, the financial stakes were very large. Offsetting
awards by charitable gifts could have cut the Fund's cost by approxi-
mately $800 million. For families of September 11th victims, such off-
sets could reduce the average award by hundreds of thousands of
dollars. For some, the symbolic and emotional stakes were also
significant.
From a charity law perspective, the coexistence of the Fund and
charitable relief raised more pointed questions: How could the Fund
program be arranged so as to prevent successful claimants (awardees)
from retaining the benefits of prior charitable gifts for their private
enrichment? What were the intentions of donors to September 11th
charities-actual or presumed-and to what extent could or should
the Fund program effectuate them? After introducing the Fund, this
section considers several ways the Fund program might have handled
charitable gifts: (a) calculated Fund awards without regard to charita-
ble gifts; (b) offset charitable gifts against awards and used the savings
for general governmental purposes; or (c) offset charitable gifts
against awards and reimbursed the charities for their outlays.1 50 After
identifying charity law's objections to each approach, I suggest a more
fitting (but still difficult) approach to the Fund's charitable gift
dilemma.
A. The Fund Program
Congress enacted the Fund shortly after the September 11th attacks
as part of the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act
of 2001 (the Act).'51 The Act authorizes the Attorney General to ap-
organizations? As compared to tort damages, it was much easier to identify early on which
applicants for a charity's assistance would or could receive Fund awards. In ordinary circum-
stances, charities would have been more obliged to consider making loans instead of outright
gifts to future awardees of Fund awards, and shift some resources to distressed persons who
were not entitled to Fund awards. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text; As one charity
worker noted:
I work for a charity (New York City Rescue Mission) which is trying to find appropriate
families to provide with monetary contributions, as designated by those who made do-
nations to us. It is challenging for us to find families who we feel will warrant this
money, knowing that they may receive much from the governmental and other funds.
See http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/W000072.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2003).
150. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
151. See Act, supra note 3. According to its caption, the Act was designed "[t]o preserve the
continued viability of the United States air transportation system." Id. The Act provides airlines
with loans, insurance guarantees, tax relief, and other assistance. The Act's Title IV, which cre-
ates the Fund, is designed (among other things) to reduce lawsuits against the airlines for their
alleged failure to take due care to prevent or reduce the harm resulting from terrorist acts.
Section 405(c)(3)(B)(i) of the Act requires Fund claimants to waive the right to sue most parties
for September 11th related damages. Id. § 405(c)(3)(B)(i).
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point a "special master" to promulgate regulations, administer the
program, and determine claims.' 52 The Attorney General appointed
Kenneth R. Feinberg, a prominent attorney, to this post. 153
To calculate a claimant's entitlement under the Fund, the Act di-
rects the Special Master to consider, inter alia, a claimant's economic
and noneconomic losses 54 and other "individual circumstances."' 55
The Act then declares that the Special Master "shall reduce [the enti-
tlement] by the amount of the collateral source compensation the
claimant has received or is entitled to receive as a result of the" at-
tacks.' 56 (I refer to this as the "offset requirement.") The Act defines
"collateral source" to mean "all collateral sources, including life insur-
ance, pension funds, death benefit programs, and payments by Fed-
eral, State, or local governments related to the" September 11th
attacks.157
On November 5, 2001, the Department of Justice (Department or
DOJ) commenced the process of implementing the Fund program by
publishing a "Notice of Inquiry and Advance Notice of Rulemaking"
(Notice) in the Federal Register.1 58 This Notice solicited comments on
"how to determine what constitutes a 'collateral source' for purposes
of [the offset requirement].' 59 In this connection, the Department
stated that it "appreciates the strong policy reasons for excluding char-
itable contributions from the definition of 'collateral sources' and in-
vites comment regarding whether the Act indeed permits the
Department to exclude such contributions from the definition."'' 60 In
other words, did the Act's plain language require charitable gifts to be
offset against Fund awards? The Notice did not identify the "strong
policy reasons" for avoiding this result.
152. Id. § 404(a).
153. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. at 66,275. For a biog-
raphy of Mr. Feinberg, see http://www.feinberggroup.com/biosFeinberg.htm (last visited Nov. 10,
2003).
154. Act, supra note 3, § 405(b)(1)(B)(i). See also id. § 402(5) ("The term 'economic loss'
means any pecuniary loss resulting from harm (including the loss of earnings or other benefits
related to employment, medical expense loss, replacement services loss, loss due to death, burial
costs, and loss of business or employment opportunities) to the extent recovery for such loss is
allowed under applicable State law."). Id. § 402(7). For the Act's definition of "noneconomic
losses," see supra note 84.
155. Id. § 405(b)(1)(B)(ii).
156. Id. § 405(b)(6).
157. Id. § 402(4) (emphasis added).
158. See generally September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 66 Fed. Reg. at 55,901; Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000).
159. Id at 66 Fed. Reg. 55,904.
160. Id. The notice also invited comments "on whether 'in kind' and/or material contributions
could or should be considered collateral sources." Id. (emphasis added).
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The Department ultimately received more than 800 written com-
ments in response to the Notice,16' and the Special Master met with
many interested persons.1 62 At one key meeting, Mr. Feinberg report-
edly told representatives of fifty or so charities that he was considering
the possibility of offsetting charitable gifts against Fund awards.1 63
The representatives strongly opposed this idea-so much so that they
"threatened to withhold their payments [to September 11th victims]
until after the Victim Compensation Fund made its awards, so as to
prevent [their payments from causing] reductions in the federal
amounts."164
This threat achieved the desired result: the Special Master ulti-
mately decided against charitable offsets. The regulations implement-
ing the offset requirement define the term "collateral source
compensation" to exclude "[c]haritable donations distributed to the
beneficiaries of the decedent, to the injured claimant, or to the benefi-
ciaries of the injured claimant by private charitable entities . "165 In
a written statement on these regulations, Mr. Feinberg explained that
"we did find ambiguity in the statute as to gifts provided to victims
and their families by private charities."'1 66 "Moreover," he said:
161. Id. at 66,275.
162. Telephone Interview with Special Master Feinberg (July 29, 2003); September l1th Vic-
tim Compensation Fund, 66 Fed. Reg. at 55,902. See also Judy Woodruff, "Attorney General
John Ashcroft Gives Press Briefing" CNN Live Event/Special 14:10, Transcript # 11260403.V54
(Nov. 26, 2001). ("I will personally see and visit with as many claimants as I can visit with, either
directly with them, with their representatives, with organizations that represent them").
163. SEESSEL, supra note 2, at 10 E-mail from Tom Seessel, non-profit consultant, to author
(Aug. 30, 2003) (on file with author) (regarding Mr. Seessel's interview with Mr. Feinberg in
Washington, D.C. on June 28, 2002). This group included the American Red Cross, the Salva-
tion Army, the September 11th Fund, and the Twin Towers Fund, among others. Id.
164. Seessel, supra note 2, at 10 (emphasis added).
165. September l1th Victim Compensation Fund, 66 Fed. Reg. at 66,287, 28 C.F.R.
§ 104.47(b)(2) (2002). Although the rule excluded bona fide charitable gifts, it authorized the
Special Master to "determine that funds provided to victims or their families through a privately
funded charitable entity constitute, in substance," life insurance, pension funds, death benefit
programs, or other collateral source compensation within the meaning of the Act. Id. This ca-
veat was included as a warning to employers of September l1th victims not to package employ-
ment benefits as charity. Special Master Kenneth Feinberg, Address at Clifford Symposium on
Tort Law and Social Policy (Apr. 24, 2003). The Rules also excluded "[tihe value of services or
in-kind charitable gifts such as provision of emergency housing, food, or clothing" from the defi-
nition of collateral sources. 28 C.F.R. § 104.47(b)(1). These "interim final rules" had the force
and effect of law immediately upon publication. On March 7, 2002, the interim final rule was
replaced by a final rule that differed only slightly from the interim final rules, and in no way
relative to our analysis. See 67 Fed. Reg. 11,233 (Mar. 13, 2002) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. 104).
I will quote only the final rules.
166. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 66 Fed. Reg. at 66,274. The Special Master
observed that while the Act expressly includes "certain items within the definition of 'collateral
sources'-life insurance, pension funds, death benefit programs, and payments by federal, state,
or local governments related to the" September 11th attacks-it "does not address whether cer-
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because the collateral offset only applies to collateral source com-
pensation that the claimant has received or is entitled to receive,
deducting charitable awards from the amount of compensation
would have the perverse effect of encouraging potential donors to
withhold their giving until after claimants have received their
awards from the Fund. 167
At a press conference on the regulations, Mr. Feinberg explained
this provision on somewhat different grounds. He did not mention
the Act's alleged ambiguity as to whether charitable gifts were a col-
lateral source. He again discussed how the Fund's treatment of chari-
table gifts might affect charitable activity. This time, however, he
focused on the activity of September 11th charities and their manag-
ers, as opposed to these organizations' actual and potential donors:
[T]he reason that we're not offsetting charitable contributions is a
very practical reason. When we meet with the charities and tell the
charities that we're thinking about offsetting charitable deductions,
even considering it-no decision was made-they made it very clear
to me that if we decided to offset charitable contributions, they'd
delay further the distribution of their money until we cut our checks,
so that that money has not yet been distributed and offset. Well,
what's the point? What's the point? We're trying to coordinate with
the charities, and if the charities are determined not to distribute
tain other types of payments"-most notably charitable gifts-fall within its purview. Id. at
66,279. Additionally, "such charitable contributions are different in kind from the collateral
sources listed in the Act." Id. The Special Master overstated the case for ambiguity in the Act's
offset provision regarding charitable gifts. Most common law jurisdictions, as we have seen, de-
fine charitable gifts as a collateral source benefit, even though these are "different in kind" from
benefits that the plaintiff has earned or was otherwise entitled to. See supra note 100 and ac-
companying text. To be sure, the Act does not expressly state that charitable gifts are a collateral
source, but this is true of every other kind of collateral source not enumerated in the Act: yet the
regulations expressly exclude only charitable gifts from the definition. Why require Congress to
make a clear statement that charitable gifts are a collateral source before defining them as such?
The answer must come from a source other than the Act, which capaciously defines the term
"collateral source" as "all collateral source[s], including life insurance and other enumerated
item." 28 C.F.R. §104.47(a) (emphasis added). Life insurance and other enumerated items-
appear to be illustrations of collateral sources, rather as a limitation on the term's scope. This
statutory language is not an occasion for invoking enjusdem generis ("of the same kind"), a
canon of statutory construction which presumes that "[w]here general words follow specific
words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects simi-
lar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words." 2A Sutherland, Stat-
utes and Statutory Construction § 48.17 at 188 (Norman Singer ed., 5th ed. 1992) (citations
omitted). Here, we have the opposite case-specific words ("life insurance", etc.) following a
general word ("all collateral sources") in a statutory enumeration.
167. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 66 Fed. Reg. at 66.279 (Statement by the
Special Master). Some commentators predicted this same result. See, e.g., ("Including such items
[charity] in the definition of collateral sources will either reduce the interest of various persons in
helping the victims and their families or will cause such persons to wait until claims have been
awarded under the Victims Compensation Fund before making such gifts."), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/W000413.html (last visited Nov. 1. 2003).
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money efficiently, it made very little sense to keep them in this
formula. And accordingly, it made a lot of sense simply to remove
charities from our equation. 168
B. Using Charitable Gifts to Augment Fund Awards
Confers Private Benefit
In calculating a claimant's award, the Fund program treats charita-
ble gifts the way most tort jurisdictions treat all collateral source bene-
fits-it ignores them. Stated differently, it applies the collateral
source rule to charitable gifts. (The Fund program offsets all other
"collateral source compensation" against awards.) This approach to
charitable gifts would seem to raise the same "excessive private bene-
fit" problem as in tort,169 but on a much larger scale. Compared to a
similarly situated tort victim, a Fund claimant will likely receive more
compensation at less cost in less time and with greater certainty.170
(Those whom the Fund is most likely to undercompensate-survivors
of the highest wage-earners-are unlikely to experience financial dis-
tress as a result.)17 1 The claimants' Fund awards, in turn, are aug-
mented by an unprecedented amount of cash assistance from
charitable organizations.
To illustrate, consider a hypothetical September 11th survivor (C)
who receives $250,000 from a charity formed to make cash gifts to
September 11th victims in financial distress. C also collects $250,000
168. Justice Department News Conference With Kenneth Feinberg, Special Master For The Sep-
tember 11th Victim Compensation Fund, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE (Dec. 20, 2001) (Mr. Fienberg
responding to a question on how the Fund will work with charities) (emphasis added).
169. See supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text.
170. See, e.g., Meet the Press with Tim Russert (NBC News broadcast Mar. 10, 2002) (guest:
Kenneth Feinberg) available at http://tampabaycoalition.homestead.com/files/311TransFeinberg
MeetThePress.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2003) (Families of September 11th victims should use
the Fund rather than sue because, "they will get paid, and they will get paid much quicker...
and they will not have any uncertainty about whether they're going to get their money or not.
They will not have to pay lawyers ... to me, it's not even a close call."). (September 11th victims
who use the Fund "very likely will receive relief that they would not recover if they choose to go
to court as per the normal course. This is because the fund was created to compensate without
requiring proof of fault or liability-which relieves the victims of the normal legal burden they
will have difficulty overcoming in court with regard to this particular tragedy."). Comments of
Senator Orrin G. Hatch (R-UT), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensationlWO004
53.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2003).
171. 28 C.F.R. § 104.43(a) (2002) ("The Special Master's methodology ... shall yield pre-
sumed determinations of loss of earnings or other benefits related to employment for annual
incomes up to but not beyond the ninety-eigth percentile of individual income in the United
States for the year 2000"); 66 Fed. Reg. 66,274, 66,278("[T]he individual circumstances of the
wealthiest and highest-income claimants will often indicate that multi-million dollar awards out
of the public coffers are not necessary to provide them with a strong economic foundation from
which to rebuild their lives.").
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in life insurance. When C later applies to the Fund, the Special
Master determines that she is entitled to $1.5 million in compensation
from all sources. The Fund then reduces this $1.5 million figure by the
$250,000 she collected from insurance, and sends her a check for $1.25
million. By ignoring the charitable gift, the Fund program permits C
to collect a total of $1.75 million in September 11th-related payments
from all sources-the $1.25 million Fund award, the $250,000 in insur-
ance, and the $250,000 charitable gift. This is almost certain to be
$250,000 more than C needs to relieve any lingering financial distress.
Even so, one hesitates to apply a straightforward private benefit
analysis to the Fund, for at least two reasons. The first has to do with
special legislation designed to facilitate September 11th charitable ac-
tivity. An estimated two-thirds of American households contributed
to September 11th-related charitable funds and organizations, 172
which raised as much as $2.7 billion.1 73 To enable all these dollars to
pass through charitable conduits at a faster pace, Congress enacted a
special law declaring that a charity's payments to September 11th vic-
tims are deemed to serve the organization's 501(c)(3)-exempt pur-
poses. 174 This provision permits 501(c)(3) entities to disburse cash to
September 11th victims without making "a specific assessment of [a
recipient's] need for the payments .... ,,t75 Most relevantly, this pro-
vision means that these payments are deemed not to confer excessive
private benefit-at least under federal tax law.176
Secondly, at least some September 11th donors gave with the spe-
cific and exclusive intent of assisting September 11th victims without
172. Ctr. on Philanthropy at Ind. Univ., AMERICA GIVES: Survey of Americans' Generosity
After September 11, available at http://www.philanthropy.iupui.edu/AmericaGivesReport.htm
(last visited Nov. 1, 2003).
173. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SEPTEMBER 11: MORE EFFECTIVE COLLABORATION
COULD ENHANCE CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS' CONTRIBUTIONS IN DISASTERS, supra note 2
at 7-8.
174. See Katz supra note 15, at 292-95; Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107-134, § 104, 115 Stat 2427, 2431 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 501(2002)) It states,
payments made by a[ 501(c)(3)] organization ... by reason of the death, injury, wound-
ing, or illness of an individual incurred as the result of the terrorist attacks against the
United States on September 11, 2001 . .. shall be treated as related to the purpose or
function constituting the basis for such organization's exemption under section 501 of
[the Internal Revenue] Code if such payments are made in good faith using a reasona-
ble and objective formula which is consistently applied.
Id.
175. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107th Cong., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE "VICTIMS
OF TERRORISM TAX RELIEF ACT OF 2001" at 11 (Comm. Print 2001).
176. The federal law presumably does not abrogate restrictions on excessive private benefit
imposed by the state law of charitable corporations and trusts.
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limit and with no strings attached. 177 Such intent can be inferred from
the "collection bowl" nature of some leading September 11th chari-
ties:178 their sole purpose was to raise and disburse as much cash as
possible to the victims.' 79 When donors contributed to such entities,
they likely did not think about how their contributions would or
should affect any subsequent formal compensation for the victims.
When the Fund program requested their input, 80 however, many do-
nors strongly opposed offsetting charitable gifts against awards. 81
Some argued that charitable offsets were unnecessary to prevent over-
compensation because the victims' pain and suffering was immeasura-
bly large.1 12  Some believed that the victims should be
overcompensated. 183 Others saw their donations as a way of expres-
177. See, e.g., http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/WO00066.html (last visited Nov. 1,
2003)("[M]y donation was a gift to firemen's widows and children, with no strings attached,");
http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/WO0024.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2003) ("I gave
money for the victims regardless of other monies they received .. "); http://www.usdoj.gov/vic
timcompensation/W000037.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2003) ("Whenever I, members of my family,
or friends have donated to a relief entity for the victims families we have never done so with
stipulations or restrictions in mind, the sole factor being that the aid should go directly to sup-
port of these individuals.").
178. See 15 AM. JUR. 2D Charities § 154 n. 53 (1988) (The nature of the donor's intention-
general or specific-"sometimes has been inferred from the character of the organization to
which the gift is made and its publicly avowed purposes or commonly known activities") (cita-
tions omitted).
179. The New York Firefighters 9-11 Disaster Relief Fund, for example, is essentially a collec-
tion bowl for families of the 347 firefighters and EMS personnel killed at the World Trade
Center. As of June 30, 2002, it had disbursed approximately $143 million in equal shares to these
families-more than $412,000 per decedent. See Katz, supra note 15, at 295. See also http://www.
oag.state.ny.us/charities/septemberll charitiable-report/septll-report.html. (last visited Nov.
10, 2003).
180. See supra notes 159-160 and accompanying text.
181. 66 Fed. Reg. at 66,274, 66,291 (Dec. 21, 2001). See, e.g., supra, note 177 Cf. 66 Fed. Reg.
at 66,290, 66,291; (donor favors charitable offsets because "it was not my intent that direct vic-
tims should become richer as a result of this tragedy"). Available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victim
compensation/W000052.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2003).
182. "The people who were most directly injured by the September 11th attack experienced a
double injury, both the physical injury or emotional loss from the physical impact of the attack
itself and the terrorizing impact of being the direct victim of an act of intense hatred. Their
injury is far greater than the amount of compensation that they could obtain either in court or
from this Fund, so there is no issue of unfair "enrichment" in this case." See http://www.usdoj.
gov/victimcompensation/W000764.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2003) (comments by the New York
State Trial Lawyers Association).
183. See, e.g., Diana B. Henriques & David Barstow, A Nation Challenged: The Charities;
Victims' Funds May Violate U.S. Tax Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2001, at BI (The attitude of
many donors to a fund for families of slain New York City police officers was that "if it makes
[the recipients millionaires], then so be it"). Professor George Wright suggests that the over-
compensation of September 11th victims expressed a collective sentiment "to exalt what evil has
attempted to annihilate-not to merely restore a lost previous level of economic well-being, but
to do something like raise the victims, or their families, as far above their prior economic status
as the enemy sought to diminish them," and thereby "to symbolically provide an ultimate eco-
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sing solidarity with the victims and national resolve to our adversaries;
more money for victims amplified these expressions.1 84  Charitable
offset, by contrast, would diminish the symbolic or moral value of
these gifts. 185 The leading September 11th charities acted as though
all of their donors opposed offset, as evidenced by their remarkable
threat to delay relief to September 11th victims unless the Special
Master agreed to ignore gifts in setting awards. 18 6
By legislative fiat, Congress authorized charities to confer upon
September 11th victims what would ordinarily constitute excessive
private benefit. Some September 11th donors believed that it was ap-
propriate to use charitable gifts to compensate victims for their losses,
including noneconomic losses, as opposed to simply relieve their dis-
tress.187 These actual donors, who stated their desire to provide seem-
ingly limitless benefits to September 11th victims, contradicted and
ultimately drowned out charity law's hypothetical donor. These and
other special circumstances surrounding September 11th temper
somewhat charity law's critique of the Fund program's approach to
charitable gifts. These anomalies notwithstanding, however, the basic
analysis remains the same.
C. Using Charitable Surplus for General Governmental Purposes
Violates the Cy Pres Principle
Instead of ignoring charitable gifts, the Special Master could have
offset them against Fund awards. In our hypothetical, this means the
nomic outcome 'opposite' that intended by the attackers." E-mail from Professor George
Wright to author (Oct. 23, 2003) (on file with author).
184. "The public-spirited Americans across the country who gave to these families did so not
only out of compassion for the people who were injured but out of anger at the perpetrators and
out of a need to communicate solidarity with the victims, who were the brunt of an attack that
actually was directed against all Americans." See http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/WO
00764.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2003) (comments by the New York State Trial Lawyers
Association).
185. "[T]o have the government attempt to belittle the gesture of its own people even further
[through charitable offsets] is as horrific as the tragedy itself." See http://www.usdoj.gov/victim
compensation/A000273.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2003). In other words, charitable offset is
equivalent on some level to terroristic mass murder! See also "This October, I asked for all my
birthday presents to be donations to a victim's fund. If these donations are deducted from the
victim's families total compensation, I will feel duped, humiliated, and outraged." See http://
www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/W000066.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2003).
186. See supra notes 162-163, 168. The charities were undoubtedly bluffing to some extent:
they were apparently threatening to do something that none of their donors wanted-deny
short-term relief to September l1th victims, including those in distress-in order to achieve
something some of their donors wanted-use gifts to augment Fund awards, even if this enriched
some victims. It would have been scandalous for the charities to do what they threatened to do,
but the threat itself achieved the desired outcome.
187. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
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Fund would subtract both insurance ($250,000) and charitable gifts
($250,000) from C's entitlement amount ($1.5 million), and send a
check for $1 million. As a matter of statutory interpretation, this ap-
proach does the least violence to the language of the Act's offset re-
quirement. 188 It would also have advanced two of the Act's goals for
the Fund: (a) that September 11th victims receive the compensation to
which the Special Master determines they are entitled; 89 but that (b)
non-Fund sources be used to pay these amounts wherever possible.190
How do charitable offsets look from a charity law perspective?
In one respect, charitable offsets are more acceptable in the Fund
context than in tort. Under the Fund program, the Federal govern-
ment rather than the tortfeasor (D) compensates the victim. This fact
alters the charitableness of using charitable gifts to reduce the payor's
liability.191 In tort, offsetting charitable gifts against D's liability
merely enriches D-a non-charitable purpose. In the Fund context,
by contrast, the use of charitable gifts to reduce the Federal govern-
ment's liability under the Fund does advance a legally charitable pur-
pose-in this case, a "governmental" purpose. 192 Such purposes can
include supplying outputs that would ordinarily be supplied at the tax-
payers' expense, thereby lowering taxes and lessening the govern-
ment's burdens. 193
Reducing the government's Fund liability may be a legally charita-
ble purpose, but it bears little connection to what most September
11th donors had in mind. Herein lies the problem. "Although the
188. See supra notes 156-157, 166 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 154-155 and accompanying text.
190. The Act seeks non-Fund sources to finance awards in various ways: (1) the general offset
requirement under discussion (Act, supra note 3, § 405(b)(6)); (2) it authorizes claimants to
bring civil actions to recover collateral source obligations (id. § 405(c)(3)(B)(i)); (3) it authorizes
the Attorney General to accept donations to the Fund, directing him to use these donations
"prior to using appropriated amounts" (id. § 406(c)(1)-(2)); and (4) it subrogates the United
States to any claim paid by the Fund. Id. § 409.
191. Note that making government the payor also changes how the matter looks from a tort
law perspective. A key rationale for the collateral source rule (including its application to chari-
table gifts) is efficiency: to achieve optimal deterrence, tortfeasors must bear the full costs of
their risky behavior, even if this overcompensates the occasional tort victim. See supra note 91
and accompanying text. Yet relatively few people justified the Fund as compensation for the
government's failure to prevent the September 1lth attacks, or defended it as a way to spur the
government to fight terrorism more vigorously. Cf. http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/
W000024.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2003) ("[T]he government," including the FBI and CIA "let
these people [September llth victims] down by not doing their jobs correctly. Consequently, the
government, and that means us the people, owe those who were affected by the tragedy compen-
sation. Just as we require other government to compensate victims, i.e. holocaust victims, we
should expect the same from ourselves").
192. See supra note 27.
193. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. k.
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public in general may benefit from any number of charitable purposes,
charitable contributions must be used for the purpose for which they
were received in trust .... ,,194 More precisely, a charitable gift must
be used for its designated or specific charitable purpose in the first
instance. If this purpose is fully accomplished without exhausting the
gift, charity law directs the unused balance or "surplus" to be applied
to a related charitable purpose. t95 This is the doctrine of cy pres, or
"as nearly (as possible). ' 196 In our hypothetical, C received $250,000
from a charity formed to relieve the financial distress of September
11th victims. When C collects a Fund award, the gift's specific charita-
ble purpose has been fully accomplished-C's financial distress has
been relieved-and an amount corresponding to the gift constitutues
charitable surplus. From a charity law perspective, applying C's
$250,000 surplus to general governmental purposes violates the cy
pres principle by ignoring donor intent.197
D. Reimbursing September 11th Charities Might Recreate
the Private Benefit
As in tort, a Fund award creates a surplus that corresponds to the
charitable gifts the claimant received, and this surplus should neither
augment the claimant's award nor reduce the payor's liability.
Rather, this surplus should be applied "to a related (cy pres) purpose
within the general scope of the donor's intent." 198 In the tort context,
as suggested above, a court could accomplish this by reimbursing the
charity that helped P when the lawsuit against D was pending.199 In
the Fund context, by contrast, this approach is less likely to stop ex-
cessive private benefit.
Charity law favors reimbursement insofar as the charity uses these
sums in ways that advance the donors' charitable intentions-specific
194. Holt v. Coll. of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 394 P.2d 932, 935 (Cal. 1964) (The
attorney general applied wrong standard in deciding whether to bring legal action against direc-
tors of charitable corporation; the standard is whether its assets were being used for the purposes
for which they were received, not whether they were being used in a manner conducive to the
public interest.).
195. See supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 70.
197. This result, whereby charitable gifts to September 11th victims are used to fund general
governmental purposes, resembles the English doctrine of prerogative cy pres. In certain situa-
tions, this doctrine authorizes the Crown to direct funds to some charitable purpose without
regard to the donor's intentions. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 cmt. h (1957).
According to the Restatement "[T]he prerogative power does not exist in the United States,"
and "cannot be exercised even by the legislature . I..." ld  (emphasis added).
198. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 510 (4th ed. 1992).
199. See supra notes 139-140 and accompanying text.
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or general, actual or imputed. We can be fairly confident of this, for
example, if the organization was formed to relieve the financial dis-
tress of current and future victims of recurring disasters.200 This entity
will undoubtedly use any reimbursed sums to help other disaster vic-
tims more distressed than Fund awardees. Its donors presumably un-
derstand and intend this.20 1  Conversely, charity law disfavors
reimbursing organizations intent on augmenting Fund awards with
charitable gifts, as was apparently the case for many leading Septem-
ber 11th charities.20 2 In our hypothetical, consider what would hap-
pen if C had received the $250,000 from a "collection bowl" entity
formed solely for September 11th victims. If the Fund program re-
duced C's award by $250,000 and sent this amount to the "collection
bowl," the entity might have simply handed the $250,000 back to C.20 3
This exercise would have been pointless (but not costless).
E. A Possible Solution: The Government Applies the Charitable
Surplus to Related Charitable Purposes
We seem to have reached an impasse. Ideally, the Fund program
would treat charitable gifts in a way that both avoids private benefit
and respects donor intent. Yet each approach we have considered
falls short on one or both accounts. The first approach, which sets C's
award without regard to charitable gifts, lets C retain the gifts' surplus
for her private benefit. The second approach avoids private benefit by
offsetting C's gifts against her award. Although this applies the sur-
plus to a legally charitable purpose-lessening the burdens of govern-
ment-this purpose is unrelated to donor intent. In the third
approach, the reimbursed charity might simply recreate the private
benefit.
Modifying the second approach might defuse the dilemma. As
before, the Fund program would offset C's charitable gifts against her
awards. Instead of improving the government's balance sheet, how-
ever, the savings or surplus would be dedicated to another charitable
purpose within the general scope of September 11th donors' inten-
tions. This approach, of course, is not without its own difficulties.
200. See Katz, supra note 15, at 266-67 (discussing general disaster relief organizations).
201. This is not always the case. The American Red Cross was famously criticized for its initial
plan to save some post-September 11th contributions for future terrorist attacks and other
projects. Id. at 312-14. The Red Cross has taken steps to clarify this for its donors. Id. at 315-16.
202. See supra notes 163-164, 168 and accompanying text.
203. This would only be permitted in an organization making payments to September l1th
victims. See supra notes 174-176 and accompanying text. Ordinarily, an organization created for
a particular disaster would have to distribute the balance of its funds once the basic needs of all
the disaster's victims are met. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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How would this alternative purpose be selected, by whom, and using
what criteria? The cy pres doctrine and case law provide some general
guidance for selecting a substitute purpose but cannot resolve the
matter. The process of deciding how to distribute the surplus invites
rent-seeking behavior.204 Different charities, for example, will argue
that their purposes are closer to the donors' intention and expend re-
sources to obtain some of the surplus.
I have no ready answers to these questions and concerns. I never-
theless note that Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) has sponsored a bill
"[t]o establish a comprehensive federal program to provide benefits to
U.S. victims of international terrorism .... -205 It calls for the creation
of a "Victims of International Terrorism Benefits Fund" to finance
cash payments for American nationals killed, injured, or held hostage
due to acts of international terrorism. 206 The proposed payments
would be the same for all victims, with no offsets for charitable gifts or
insurance. 20 7 Had this option been available, some September 11th
donors might have preferred their gifts' surplus to go to this Fund,
which would help victims of future terrorist attacks, instead of provid-
ing more aid to Fund awardees.208
V. CONCLUSION
The controversy over the Fund's approach to charitable gifts drew
attention to a long-standing but little-noticed tension between the op-
erations of two systems for alleviating injury-related losses: charitable
relief and formal compensation schemes. This tension originates in
the divergent legal principles that govern the use of charitable assets
as compared to those for awarding compensation. This tension is
demonstrated most starkly by the collateral source rule, which both
the Fund and tort law apply to charitable gifts. Under this rule, com-
pensation is calculated without regard to the prior charitable gifts a
victim (P) has received to alleviate the same losses. This approach, as
we have seen, is true even if the compensation alone would make P
204. See THE MACMILLAN DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS, supra note 37, at 372 (de-
fining "rent seeking" as "[t]he use of real resources in an attempt to appropriate a surplus in the
form of a rent").
205. S. 1275, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003).
206. Id. §§ 6(b), 10.
207. Id. at § 7(a). The proposed benefits track those made by the Public Safety Officers'
Benefits Program, subpart 1 of part L of title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. § 3796).
208. See, e.g., http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/WOOOO03.html (last visited Nov. 1,
2003) ("In regard to dispersing the Victims funds verses [sic] what charity gives it's important to
remember that there may be more victims in the future that will have needs and not to give all
the funds away too soon.")
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whole.209 A compensation scheme that applies the collateral source
rule to charitable gifts facilitates the use of charitable assets for pri-
vate enrichment. Tort law confounds matters further by asserting or
assuming that the charitable donors intended to enrich P. It is more
plausible and socially beneficial to presume, as charity law does, that
charitable donors intended to help P insofar as P belonged to the do-
nee charity's charitable class, or insofar as such help served to relieve
P's distress.
The alternative to conferring excessive benefits on P is not to re-
duce the payor's liability. In the tort context, this simply shifts the
private enrichment to the tortfeasor. Even when reducing the payor's
liability serves a legally charitable end, as in the Fund context, this end
may bear little or no relation to the charitable donors' intentions.
When compensation converts charitable gifts into a surplus, this sur-
plus should be applied to a charitable purpose related to the donors'
original intentions.
Charities distributed an unprecedented $ 268,800 on average for
each person killed on September 11th. 210 By applying the collateral
source rule to these gifts, the Fund program facilitated the use of char-
itable assets for private benefit on an unprecedented scale. As a prac-
tical matter, there was little the Special Master could have done to
prevent this. The Fund debate asked donors and the public to choose
between two possible destinations for September llth's charitable
surplus: the victims or the federal government. Because of the
uniquely charged conditions surrounding the Fund and the attacks,
the most vocal donors and charities overwhelmingly chose the victims,
as was probably appropriate. In retrospect, however, the better solu-
tion would have been to direct the surplus to a program such as Sena-
tor Lugar's "Victims of International Terrorism Benefits Fund." This
would have curtailed the Fund's role in facilitating excessive private
benefit by the most recent victims of terrorism and better served the
public interest in the dreaded event of future attacks. It would also
have approximated more closely the aims of September 11th donors,
who wanted to help terrorist victims (as opposed to general govern-
mental purposes), express solidarity with them, and convey national
resolve.
Compared to the Special Master, civil courts have more opportuni-
ties and authority to curtail private benefit by compensated plaintiffs,
209. Even if P's compensation award (after being reduced by the amount of charitable gifts P
received) does not fully compensate P's losses, it may nonetheless suffice to relieve P's financial
distress. Letting P retain the gift's benefits also results in excessive private benefit.
210. See supra note 146.
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recover charitable resources they no longer need, and reapply these
resources to purposes related to their donors' intentions. The next
steps are to identify if, when, and how courts should undertake to do
so. When would it be worthwhile? How would this affect serial reci-
procity as a social norm? Should courts simply exhort prevailing
plaintiffs to "pay it forward," that is, help others as they were helped
to the extent possible? In any event, courts need not do all the work
on their own initiative and after the fact. A charitable organization
can, if it wishes, provide its benefits as conditional gifts instead of out-
right gifts: a recipient would not be obliged to reimburse the charity
unless he or she later receives damages for the same losses. Do many
charities do this? If not, should more consider doing so? I leave these
and other questions to another day.
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